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Marriage Equality and a Lawyer’s Role in the
Emergence of “New” Rights
Daniel J. Canon*
INTRODUCTION
In 2015, the author was fortunate enough to
represent six couples and their children before the United
States Supreme Court in two Kentucky cases styled Love
v. Beshear and Bourke v. Beshear,1 which are now better
known by their consolidated name: Obergefell v. Hodges.2
When the case was accepted by the high Court, a handful
of day-to-day civil litigators were drawn into a different
world—one few lawyers get to see. Even lawyers who
regularly practice at the Supreme Court do not often see
the kind of concerted effort witnessed by the advocates in
Obergefell. It was the culmination of decades of work by
countless activists, scholars, organizations, and lawyers.
And all that effort was in order to create what amounted
to a new right.3
* Visiting professor, University of Louisville Louis D. Brandeis School of Law.
The author has been a practicing litigator for the past decade and has
represented clients in several high-profile and/or seminal cases in the area of
civil rights. See, e.g., Nwanguma v. Trump, 273 F. Supp. 3d 719 (W.D. Ky.
2017); Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924 (E.D. Ky. 2015); Obergefell v.
Hodges, 192 L. Ed. 2d 609 (2015); Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542
(W.D. Ky. 2014). The author is grateful to Dr. Joanne Sweeny for helpful
guidance on this project and research assistants Irina Strelkova and Aleisha
Cowles for their excellent work.
1 989 F. Supp. 2d 536 (W.D. Ky. 2014); 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
2 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
3 Whether or not the right is “new” depends on who is asked, and how you
define the scope of the right. The legal fiction that the right to same-sex
marriage existed in 1878, but had not quite been discovered yet, was a
critical argument to some proponents of marriage equality, and indeed is
discussed in no uncertain terms by the District Court in Bourke v. Beshear,
discussed at length infra. (“For many others, this decision could raise basic
questions about our Constitution. For instance, are courts creating new
rights? Are judges changing the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment or
our Constitution? Why is all this happening so suddenly? The answer is that
the right to equal protection of the laws is not new. History has already
shown us that, while the Constitution itself does not change, our
understanding of the meaning of its protections and structure evolves. If this
were not so, many practices that we now abhor would still exist.”) Bourke,
996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 556 (W.D. Ky. 2014), rev'd sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder,
772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev'd sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584 (2015) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Had those
who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or
the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold
possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to
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In 1970, two men from Minnesota tried to get a
marriage license. They took their case all the way to the
Supreme Court, too. But in a sharp contrast with Justice
Kennedy’s grandiose, 28-page opinion in Obergefell, the
holding of Baker v. Nelson contained but one sentence:
“The appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question.”4 In other words, a right to same-sex marriage
under the Constitution was not an idea the Court was
willing to entertain, even as a threshold issue. What
happened between 1970 and 2015 to catapult an assertion
of a right thought of as a fringe idea worth only one
dismissive sentence to a full-fledged, constitutional right?
And how can practitioners replicate that success on behalf
of clients who seek changes in the law, including the
recognition of “new” rights?
This Article seeks to begin the process of answering
those questions. To do so, the Article uses the example of
the Obergefell litigation, and changes in social
circumstances between Baker and Obergefell, to provide a
working conceptual model to be used by lawyers seeking
to aid in bringing new rights into being. Part II discusses
the development of same-sex marriage in the context of
the historical concept of rights overall. In Part III, this
Article posits a model of rights as existing in three
different stages. Part IV explores a number of identifiable
factors that advance rights through those three different
stages. Part V discusses, in a practical and historical
sense, how the concepts identified in the previous sections
came into play in establishing marriage equality as a
right. Part VI briefly deals with the issue of caution and
incrementalism vis-à-vis the role of the practitioner in
litigating a client’s rights. And the final section discusses
ways a practitioner can use these concepts to further civil
and human rights in her own practice.
have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve
only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can
invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.”)). No doubt this
argument resonated with originalists struggling to square a uniquely twentyfirst century idea with an eighteenth century document. And there are still
others who would prefer not to think of the right to same-sex marriage as
distinct from the right to marriage overall. But in the broad context of human
history, the idea that two persons of the same biological sex could possess a
right to be married is undeniably novel, and that is the assumption from
which this article proceeds.
4 Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972).
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SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AS A RIGHT
A. What is a right?

At the outset, it is useful to discuss briefly what is
meant by a “right” in this context. From a strictly
academic perspective, there is no widespread agreement
as to what a “right” is, or where rights come from.5 For
our purposes, it is less important to specifically define
these terms than it is to conduct a gross observation of
how they operate.
First, let us dispense with the idea that any rights
are fixed, at least from a legal standpoint. Indeed, the
entire concept of individual rights did not exist in any sort
of cognizable form until the last couple of centuries or so;
ancient languages did not even have a word that meant
“rights.”6 Legal theorist Edward L. Rubin discusses the
origin of property “rights” as coming from English
philosopher and theologian William of Ockham.7 Though
laws regarding ownership of property were common in the
Middle Ages, the concept of an inherent “right” to
property was not. Ockham’s “general position was that
human beings possess an inherent right to use material
objects and an inherent liberty that can perhaps be
regarded as a right. They then establish, by means of
human law, systems of property rights and political
rights.”8 Thus, according to Ockham and those that
followed his reasoning, property rights were what we
might call “natural rights.”
Critical for our purposes, “natural rights can be
asserted by individuals against political authorities.”9 For
example, Hobbes posited an early, natural right of selfpreservation, which meant (among other things) that
“subjects cannot be ordered to kill themselves, although
they may be executed.”10 As such, most early “rights” were
kept separate and apart from the few natural rights that

For an extensive, scholarly discussion of the origin of human rights, see
Edward L. Rubin, Rethinking Human Rights, 9 INT’L. LEGAL THEORY 5, 8–9
(2003).
6 JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2d ed.
2013).
7 Rubin, supra note 5, at 13–14.
8 Id. at 16.
9 Id. at 17.
10 Id. at 22.
5
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people could assert as against their own government.11
“[A]lmost all the protections against government that we
currently associate with human rights were products of
social movements that were unrelated to natural rights
theory.”12
In Rubin’s view, in the late eighteenth century, this
began to change.
[T]he natural rights conception was losing its
force and revealing government as a purely
human and potentially unconstrained creation.
Under those circumstances, it was reassuring
to describe the protection that they championed
as rights, rights that were related to the
natural rights that people possessed in their
presocial condition. It became possible to
envision a right to speak, to worship freely, to
be free of slavery or torture, and to be tried by
due process of law. Such rights, like natural
rights, could be conceived as possessions,
borrowing, by virtue of their form, the
sacerdotal quality of their God-given
predecessors. Like natural rights, these
possessions
existed
independently
of
government, and controlled the government’s
proper relationship to individuals.13
In other words, social movements co-opted the label of
“rights” generally from the idea of “natural rights,” and
began to apply that label to things that were pragmatic
social needs. Of course, specific information on how those
needs came to be widely recognized as rights by societies
during and before the eighteenth century is sparse. But
the point is that the longstanding moral authority of a
“natural right” was purposefully harnessed and used by
social movements to control the behavior of the state and
to facilitate the wishes of a group of people who might
otherwise lack the political power to vindicate those
wishes.14

Id. at 47.
Id.
13 Id. at 49–50.
14 See DONNELLY, supra note 6, at 11–12.
11
12
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As a result, a “right” as we understand it in twentyfirst century America is a social trump card; it allows for
the assertion that a power structure must do something
that it would not otherwise do in order to accommodate an
individual.15 As one scholar puts it, rights are “moral
demands on government.”16 So, by definition, power
structures do not recognize rights at their inception. To
the contrary, this initial stage is often marked by apathy,
scorn, or ridicule by the majority and, by extension,
governmental and other institutions that reflect the
majority view (or “political authorities,” to use Rubin’s
nomenclature).17 Even those rights one might consider
most basic today were, at best, luxuries to previous
generations, not at all within the purview of government
action or non-action.18
But now, by and large, people the world over have
figured out the power of asserting something as a “right”
and not merely a desire as a means of managing the
behavior of governing institutions. As a result, rights are
born at an ever-increasing frequency. Today’s wishes are
tomorrow’s fervent hopes and the next day’s god-given
rights. Contemporary examples abound. In 2016, the
United Nations “declared that ‘online freedom’ is a
‘human right,’ and one that must be protected.”19 The
Right to Try Act of 2017, which became federal law in May
2018, provides patients with an affirmative right to
“obtain investigational drugs outside of clinical trials.”20
Advances in neurotechnology have led to calls for the
Id. at 7–8; see also Neil Stammers, Social Movements and the Social
Construction of Human Rights, 21 JOHNS HOPKINS U. PRESS, HUM. RTS. Q.
980, 982–983 (1999), http://www.jstor.org/stable/762754.
16 Rubin, supra note 5, at 66.
17 “First they ignore you. Then they ridicule you. And they attack you and
want to burn you. And then they build monuments to you.” Nicholas Klein,
Address During a Biennial Convention of Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America (May 15, 1918) (speaking about that union).
18 See Rubin, supra note 5, at 34–45 (discussing the abolition of slavery, the
abolition of torture, and the birth of due process rights).
19 Tim Sandle, UN Thinks Internet Access as a Human Right, BUS. INSIDER
(Jul. 22, 2016, 11:57 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/un-says-internetaccess-is-a-human-right-2016-7; see also, e.g., What is the Human Right to
Housing?, NAT’L ECON. & SOC. RTS. INITIATIVE,
https://www.nesri.org/programs/what-is-the-human-right-to-housing (last
visited May 11, 2018); Jimmy Tobias, Meet the Rising New Housing
Movement That Wants to Create Homes for All, NATION (May 24, 2018),
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-way-home/.
20 Kate Traynor, Federal Right-to-try Law Aims to Broaden Access to
Investigational Drugs, AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 1085, 1085 (2018),
http://www.ajhp.org/content/75/15/1085?sso-checked=true.
15

217

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

[7:2

“creation of new rights to protect people from potential
harm[,]” such as the right to “mental privacy” and the
right to “psychological continuity.”21 Rights such as these,
in various stages of recognition, and concerning just about
any topic, can be readily observed. Most of these are not
“natural” rights in any realistic sense, and it is difficult to
see how it is a derivative of any natural right in the
Hobbesian sense.
B. The History of Marriage as a Right
As part of making a case to the Supreme Court as
to why the right to same-sex marriage should exist, the
Obergefell litigators had to learn the history of the
assertion of that right, at least in a judicial context, in
order to explain to the Court why government should
conform its conduct to that assertion now when it had
never done so before. There was not much to know. When
Richard Baker and James McConnell applied for a
marriage license in Minnesota in 1970, people laughed.
Eventually, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued a curt
and cursory rebuke of their legal arguments.22 And a year
later, the Supreme Court summarily discarded the idea of
same-sex marriage as a right altogether.23 This was the
same Court that just a half-decade before had
unanimously affirmed a right to interracial marriage—an
idea which was ridiculed throughout most of America’s
history,24 but by 1967 “reflect[ed] the central meaning” of
the Fourteenth Amendment.25 In the succeeding years,
Marcello Ienca & Roberto Andorno, Towards New Human Rights in the Age
of Neuroscience and Neurotechnology, LIFE SCI., SOC’Y AND POL’Y 2 (Apr. 26,
2017), https://lsspjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40504-0170050-1.
22 See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971).
23 Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
24 Peggy Pascoe, Why the Ugly Rhetoric Against Gay Marriage is Familiar to
this Historian of Miscegenation, COLUMBIAN C. OF ARTS & SCI. AT THE GEO.
WASH. U. (Apr. 19, 2004) https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/4708.
25 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967); compare the recounting of the
congressional debates over what eventually became the Fourteenth
Amendment contained in R.C. Pittman, The Fourteenth Amendment: Its
Intended Effect on Anti-Miscegenation Laws, 43 N.C. L. REV. 92, 94–95 (1964)
(“Senator Lyman Trumbull, who had introduced the Bill and was its
manager, made it clear that there was no intention to nullify the antimiscegenation statutes or constitutional requirements of the various states . .
. . On that point he said: . . . . ‘Are not both races treated alike by the law of
Indiana? Does not the law make it just as much a crime for a white man to
21
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the Court affirmed the fundamental marriage rights of
prisoners and parents who were behind on support
payments.26
Shortly after the fundamental right to marriage
was firmly established by this series of cases in the
United States Supreme Court, individual states began to
contemplate same-sex marriage in earnest. In 1993, in a
case called Baehr v. Lewin, the Hawaii Supreme Court
intimated that someday, maybe same-sex marriage could
be possible.27 Then, in 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health said
that marriage was a right to be enjoyed by couples within
the state.28 At the same time, the right to sexual intimacy
between adults, regardless of sex, emerged in the United
States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Lawrence v.
Texas.29 And in 2013, in United States v. Windsor, Justice
Kennedy called the right to same-sex marriage, as
conferred by certain states, “a dignity and status of
immense import,” hinting that the country might be at a
tipping point.30 It was. And the tipping was realized by
Obergefell.
However, the stark difference between Obergefell
and Baker cannot be explained solely by reference to case
law, or even the combination of jurisprudential changes
and a few successful ballot initiatives. As legal scholar
and ACLU National Legal Director, David Cole, succinctly
puts it, “constitutional law develops not by slippery-slope
arguments made in the abstract, but through public
debate about fundamental principles and values, pressed
by people with powerful commitments willing to make
sustained efforts in multiple arenas—local, state, and
federal, public and private, at home and at work.”31 How
marry a black woman as for a black woman to marry a white man, and vice
versa?’”).
26 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 100 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
377 (1978).
27 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
28 Goodridge v. Dep’t Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
29 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564, 579 (2003) (right of consenting
adults to sexual intimacy); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (right to use contraception).
30 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 768 (2013).
31 DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO
MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 91 (2016) (ebook, Kindle ed.). Were it otherwise,
individual rights, once validated by a constitutional provision, would be
limitless. Detractors of marriage equality, including Justice Alito, often imply
that same-sex marriage is the herald of (at least) a constitutional right to
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can a litigator conceptualize the way in which this
complicated series of cultural changes occurs, and make it
work in her own law practice? How can an amorphous set
of cultural changes be put into motion in a deliberate,
conscious way by an individual practitioner? These
questions are explored below.
II.

THE THREE-STAGE LIFE CYCLE OF RIGHTS

If a gross oversimplification is allowed, rights may
be observed in three stages. The first stage in the life of a
right occurs when someone speaks it into being. It is the
point in time where a want is elevated to the status of an
entitlement, at least in the mind of the wanter.32 And it is
when an individual or group of individuals, often
members of an outgroup or subculture with limited
political power, demand that governing power structures
behave a certain way in accordance with that entitlement.
Jumping ahead, the third and final stage is one in
which a right gains total institutional acceptance. Over
time, the right is taken for granted by the power
polygamy. “‘Suppose we rule in your favor in this case and then, after that, a
group consisting of two men and two women apply for a marriage license,’ he
said to Mary Bonauto, one of the lawyers arguing against state bans on samesex marriage. ‘Would there be any ground for denying them?’” Amy Davidson
Sorkin, Justice Alito’s Polygamy Perplex, NEW YORKER (Apr. 30, 2015)
https://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/justice-alitos-polygamyperplex. While the Obergefell oralist, Mary Bonauto, gave an adept legal
answer, the answer is less a legal one than a practical one; the cultural
preconditions for such a development in the law have not yet been met. The
same was true in 1972; although marriage was a fundamental right that
prohibited states from criminalizing interracial marriage, this same right did
not extend to same-sex marriage—at least not yet. Of course, this does not
mean that legitimized polygamy is inevitable, rather that significant cultural
groundwork would have to be done for the right to plural marriage to be
institutionally recognized.
32 It is worth noting that this view is in accord with Rubin’s conception of the
origin of human rights. According to Rubin, rights have historically derived
almost exclusively from the concept of natural liberty, or the “assumption
that people are naturally free, and voluntarily submit to social control in
return for the benefits of civil order.” Rubin, supra note 5, at 59–60. A better
way to view the origin of those rights is by starting from the “assumption
that people are comprehensively controlled by a dense multiplicity of social
and political prescriptions. Liberty, according to this view, is not something
they are given, something that they naturally possess, but something they
must struggle to create.” Id. at 60. Such an approach acknowledges that
rights, and even the sources of those rights, are ad hoc creations that are
responsive to attendant circumstances, rather than something fixed,
universal, or naturally occurring. Moreover, this view “pays homage to the
dissidents, protestors and nonconformists who have seized liberty from the
forces of repression.” Id. at 61.
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structures that rejected it in the first place, as if to say “of
course this is a right, we always recognized it as such.”33
Those who ignore the institutional acceptance do so at
their own peril. The right has become part of the preexisting power structures and often makes them
stronger.34 To return to the example of marriage equality,
its third stage was realized by Obergefell.
But the second stage—the one at which marriage
equality found itself in the wake of Windsor—is the one to
which a lawyer’s craft is most effectively applied. It is
here when a right, teetering on the precipice of total
institutional acceptance, may be given a final shove by
impact litigators. At stage two, a right, having been
spoken into existence by an individual, begins to gain
acceptance by people who do not benefit from it,35 and
later by institutions which formerly suppressed it.
For example, while Americans tend to take for
granted the right to be free of race discrimination in the
workplace, more than half of all states still do not
explicitly recognize a corresponding right based on sexual
orientation.36 However, many power structures do
recognize such a right, including municipalities within
states that do not.37 This right is ripening. The tension on
See, e.g., Richard Rothstein, Misteaching History on Racial Segregation, 70
SCH. ADMIN. 38 (2013), http://www.aasa.org/content.aspx?id=30814).
34 See Blake Ellis, Gay Marriage Boosts NYC's Economy by $259 Million in
First Year, CNN MONEY (July 24, 2012, 6:01 PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2012/07/24/pf/gay-marriage-economicimpact/index.htm.
35 An interesting question is that of when to call what is sought a “right,” and
to whom. As Cole notes, “Simon and Watts [a pollster and psychologist,
respectively, interviewed by the author] . . . found that arguments phrased in
the language of ‘rights’ were not particularly effective.” COLE, supra note 31,
at 73. However, as noted above, the term “right” itself carries a particular
contextual meaning and moral weight and must be invoked at some point if
the right is ever to achieve total institutional recognition. Moreover, Simon
and Watts appear to contemplate messaging which “characterized marriage
as a ‘civil right’ and linked the fight for marriage equality to the battles
against segregation and race-based internment of Japanese-Americans,”
which, naturally, complicates matters. Id. at 71–72. One need not implicitly
refer to the bigotry of those who stand against a new right, nor explicitly
invoke any historical period, for the basic terminology of rights to be effective.
36 Twenty-six states do not have a state law preventing workplace
discrimination based upon sexual orientation. Non-Discrimination Laws,
MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equalitymaps/non_discrimination_laws (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).
37 See, e.g., LOUISVILLE, KY., CODE ORD. § 92.06 (1999),
http://library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Kentucky/loukymetro/titleigeneral
provisions/chapter21ethicscode?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlega
l:louisville_ky$anc=JD_Chapter21; Paducah Becomes Kentucky’s 9th City
33
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the proponents’ side is almost equal to that of the
opponents.38 Likewise, the right not to be executed is
currently in a state of equilibrium. For nearly all of
human history, it was a foregone conclusion that the state
had the power to put people to death. But in the last fifty
years, nearly all of Western society, and indeed nearly the
world, has abolished capital punishment.39 In the twentyfirst century alone, eight states have abolished it.40 In
addition, some courts have acted to eradicate the death
penalty either in practice or as a matter of constitutional
principle, and at least two Supreme Court Justices believe
the practice itself to violate the Eighth Amendment.41
Another as-yet unripe idea is that of the would-be
right to compensated family leave. Again, this is a right
that much of the world takes for granted already, but it is
just now gathering steam in the United States.42 It began,
as rights do, with individuals asserting that to raise a
family and still be financially solvent is not just a desire,
but a right. Similarly, medical marijuana, now accepted in
one form or another by more than half the states, is
nearing its critical mass.43 The list of rights in limbo
between partial and total institutional acceptance,
examples of which are explored in more depth in Section
VIII, infra, is getting longer all the time.
with LGBT Fairness, ACLU KY. (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.acluky.org/en/news/paducah-becomes-kentuckys-9th-city-lgbt-fairness-0.
38 Non-discrimination Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT,
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_laws (last visited
Sept. 3, 2018); see also Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339
(7th Cir. 2017).
39 Oliver Smith, Countries That Still Have the Death Penalty, TELEGRAPH
(July 6, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/maps-andgraphics/countries-that-still-have-the-death-penalty/.
40 The eight states that have abolished the death penalty in the twenty-first
century are Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, and Washington. 30 States with the Death Penalty and 20
States with Death Penalty Bans, PROCON.ORG (Oct. 16, 2018, 10:30 AM),
https://deathpenalty.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=001172.
41 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(describing his belief that the death penalty now may qualify as cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment).
42 Kelly Wallace, Paid Leave For Parents: What's The Right Amount Of
Time?, CNN (June 29, 2017, 2:05 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/29/health/paid-leave-how-much-timeenough/index.html.
43 “A total of 33 states, the District of Columbia, Guam and Puerto Rico have
approved a comprehensive public medical marijuana and cannabis
programs.” State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. (Jan. 23,
2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuanalaws.aspx.
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To sum up: for our purposes, rights occur in three
stages:
1. A right is conceived by an individual or group and
is spoken into being. It has no formal, institutional
recognition.
2. A right gains some formal recognition, usually
through a court opinion, an executive order,44 or a
legislative act.
3. A right achieves total institutional recognition and
becomes part of the status quo. Non-recognition of
the right by individuals leads to negative
consequences.45
IV.

MOVERS OF RIGHTS

Much has been written about the origin and
development of rights through the courts.46 But little is
understood of the mechanisms that further such
development. A notable recent exception is the work of
David Cole.47 This Article, in part, uses Cole’s expository
framework together along with the author’s own
experiences and other theoretical frameworks to create a
conceptual model to be used by practicing attorneys who
seek vindication of “new” rights on behalf of clients.
Put another way, above, this Article seeks to
provide a preliminary answer to this question: what are
the factors that help a right get from stage one to stage
three in the aforementioned model, and what is a lawyer’s
Executive actions are not dealt with extensively in this Article, but a
noteworthy example in the context of marriage equality is then-Mayor of San
Francisco Gavin Newsom’s decision to issue marriage licenses on February
12, 2004 (ten years to the day from the historic trial court opinion on
marriage equality in Kentucky). Melanie Mason, When Gavin Newsom Issued
Marriage Licenses In San Francisco, His Party Was Furious. Now, It’s A
Campaign Ad, L.A. TIMES (May 15, 2018, 12:05 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-gavin-newsom-gay-marriage20180515-story.html.
45 See Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924 (E.D. Ky. 2015). This model is akin
to the Hegelian dialectic: thesis (an assertion of a right) meets antithesis (the
opposition to institutional recognition) resulting in synthesis (formal
recognition of the right, albeit probably in a watered-down version, if you ask
those who originally asserted it). See Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Hegel’s Dialectics, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel-dialectics/.
46 Important Supreme Court Cases for Civil Rights, LEADERSHIP CONF.,
https://civilrights.org/judiciary/federal-court-system/important-supremecourt-cases-civil-rights (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).
47 COLE, supra note 31.
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role in making it happen? As alluded to above, the answer
lies in stage two, in which a focused effort may be made to
shove a right from partial to total institutional
recognition.
If that sounds relatively simple in theory, it is not
at all simple in practice. Rights have historically
languished for (at least) decades at stage two. For
example, when delegates got together at Seneca Falls,
New York, in 1848 to discuss the future of women’s rights,
the concept of suffrage was a fringe idea favored by only a
few at the convention.48 It was briefly considered and,
ironically enough, voted down.49 The next eighty years
were an uphill, door-to-door battle that included a
Supreme Court loss, but which finally resulted in the
Nineteenth Amendment.50 Or consider that even after
Franklin Roosevelt, a popular President with a disability,
took office for three terms in a row, it was another fifty
years before the Americans with Disabilities Act was
signed into law.51 The battle for institutional recognition
is often tedious, taxing, and bloody. But the last thirty
years have seen a dramatic increase in the pace of
cultural interchange, such that people can watch rights
come to fruition in real time and can consciously aid in
the process.52
In the abstract, what common factors moved
suffrage from a fanciful notion to a full-fledged right, led
to taking the right to be free of racial discrimination in
the workplace for granted and caused the Court’s
dramatic shift between Baker and Obergefell? As a
Allison Lange, Suffrage and the Seneca Falls Convention, NWHM, (Fall
2015), http://www.crusadeforthevote.org/seneca-falls-meeting/.
49 Woman Suffrage: History and Time Line, VCU LIBR. SOC. WELFARE HIST.
PROJECT, https://socialwelfare.library.vcu.edu/woman-suffrage/womansuffrage-history/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).
50 See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875). This illustrates a fact
that should be fairly self-evident in this context, which is that institutional
recognition can be achieved through legislation, or perhaps even executive
action, as well as via the judicial branch. How the process plays out outside of
a judicial realm is beyond the scope of this Article.
51 42 U.S.C. § 12101–12213 (1990).
52 The author is cognizant that “an ‘individual’s rights’ model . . . exists
specifically to legitimize power over ongoing relationships of exploitation.”
Gabriel Arkles, Pooja Gehi & Elana Redfield, The Role of Lawyers in Trans
Liberation: Building a Transformative Movement for Social Change, 8
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 579, 595 (2010), Strategies for change outside of the
legal system are beyond the scope of this Article; rather the focus here is on
bringing diverse elements to work within the confines of existing legal power
structures.
48
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guidepost, this article suggests an examination of five
primary forces, or “movers,” which push rights from stage
two to stage three, as represented by the figure below.

1. The Activists
These are the individuals who assert that their
wants, needs, or desires ought to become rights. They are
the prime movers for social change. Their ideas tend to be
developed further, and taken more seriously, once the
remaining four categories get involved. But the most
important step happens here, as the mere assertion that
something is a right carries weight in and of itself, even to
those who believe it is not (or should not be) a right.
2. The Media
News media can often uncover information that a
lawyer might otherwise overlook or not have access to.
But the truly critical role played by the media is that of

225

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

[7:2

provoking people to think—and talk—about something
they otherwise wouldn’t. Similarly, someone asserting a
right can be humanized, and ultimately normalized, by
the media. When a person’s face is repeatedly beamed
into someone’s living room, it makes ostracizing or
“othering” that person, and their associated experiences,
more difficult.53
3. The Academics
These are the scholars, typically associated with
universities, who validate, develop, and lend credence to
the ideas of the activists. In the context of litigation,
academics tend to further rights in two ways: 1) by
publishing works that provide foundation for, or aid in the
development of, the way a right is presented to a court by
attorneys; and 2) by providing direct or indirect testimony
in judicial proceedings. Through their work, academics
assure judges (and the public) that a court’s decision will
not inadvertently bring about social disaster by being
drastically out of sync with scientific or community
standards.
4. The Organizations
These are officially organized groups of activists
and lawyers who are dedicated to one or more discrete
purposes, generally advocacy and/or policy matters. An
organization’s focus on both particular policies and the
applicable law often provide a focused view of the overall
health of a fledgling right, and how to help grow its wings.
5. The Trench Lawyers
These are lawyers in private practice, engaged in
the work of representing individuals in civil rights cases.
In some ways, the individual lawyer’s mission is
diametrically opposed to the mission of a national
organization. National organizations have a macrocosmic
focus—how can we solve the big-picture problem? But the

“In this way, we can conceive of a powerful challenger movement as
‘holding up a mirror’ in which society recognizes its own reflection.”
JONATHAN SMUCKER, HEGEMONY HOW-TO: A ROADMAP FOR RADICALS 62 (2017).
53
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individual advocate’s focus is necessarily microcosmic—
how can I solve this client’s problem?
The process of successfully bringing rights into
being is a holistic one. The star model is apt because all
five of these categories touch upon, feed off of, and play
into one another. A successful litigator knows how to use
all five simultaneously; she will use the narratives of the
activists, the resources of the national organizations, the
platform of the media, and the ideas of the academics to
push a right out of the shadows into the light of
institutional recognition.54
Unfortunately, the law tends to be an exclusionary
profession, even in the context of civil and human rights
work. Legal and social movement scholars have noted:
troubling dynamics where lawyers take center
stage, where the voices of people with the most
privilege in our communities are centralized,
where knowledge stays within the legal
profession rather than being shared outside of
it, where an intersectional analysis is lacking,
and where decisions about priorities are made in
isolation from many key movement leaders and
the people who are most impacted by the
issues.55
This model seeks to avoid such outcomes by actively
encouraging the practitioner to incorporate the ideas and
resources of the other “movers” into flexible, collaborative
litigation strategies.
V.

HOW THE MOVERS AFFECTED MARRIAGE

Utilizing this view of rights formation, there is an
observable reason why Richard Baker lost at the Supreme
Court in 1973. At that time, sex acts between consenting
adults of the same sex were still criminalized in much of
See generally “Successful social movements characteristically put great
effort into actively courting influential supporters, in order to set more social
forces into aligned motion.” Id. at 70. Note that this is in keeping with Social
Movement Theory, which “has shown that it takes more than discontent with
one’s current situation to produce a social movement. Instead, a movement is
created when groups combine their ideologies with instrumentally rational
action.” JoAnne Sweeny, The United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act: Using its
Past to Predict its Future, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 39, 47 (2010).
55 Arkles, supra note 52, at 584.
54
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the United States.56 There was no national dialogue about
same-sex marriage at the beginning of the 1970s because
there was no meaningful national dialogue about samesex relations of any kind.57 And the media was no help. In
1967, Mike Wallace reported that “homosexuality [was]
an enigma” and that “Americans consider homosexuality
more harmful to society than adultery, abortion, and
prostitution.”58 The rare gay television or movie character
was a foil, or an outright villain.59 In Hollywood, for an
actor or director to be publicly identified as gay or lesbian
was often a career-ender as late as the early 1990s.60
Academics, by and large, condemned same-sex
attractions too (or were mostly silent on the matter).61 At
academic institutions, openness about same-sex attraction
“commonly was cause for dismissal or denial of tenure.”62
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) did not
remove homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders until 1973—the year Baker
was decided.63
Also that year, advocacy organizations supportive
of same-sex couples were virtually nonexistent. The
ACLU had just begun its Sexual Privacy Project, which
Richard Weinmeyer, The Decriminalization of Sodomy in the United States,
16 AMA J. OF ETHICS 916 (Nov. 2014), https://journalofethics.amaassn.org/article/decriminalization-sodomy-united-states/2014-11; Ed
Grabianowski, How the Stonewall Riots Worked, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM,
https://history.howstuffworks.com/historical-events/stonewall-riots.htm (last
visited February 1, 2019).
57 Rebecca J. Rosen, A Glimpse Into 1970s Gay Activism, THE ATLANTIC (Feb.
26, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/02/a-glimpseinto-1970s-gay-activism/284077/.
58 Kim Smythe, The Homosexuals—Mike Wallaces CONTROVERSIAL 1967
CBS Report (FULL VIDEO), YOUTUBE (Sept. 13, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tu1r6igCODw (‘The Homosexuals’ is a
1967 episode of the documentary television series CBS Reports. The hourlong broadcast featured a discussion of a number of topics related to
homosexuality and homosexuals. Mike Wallace anchored the episode, which
aired on Mar. 7, 1967.).
59 Fred Fejes & Kevin Petrich, Invisibility, Homophobia and Heterosexism:
Lesbians, Gays and the Media, 10 CRITICAL STUD. MASS COMM. 395, 400
(1993).
60 Id. at 399.
61 VERNON A. ROSARIO, SCIENCE AND HOMOSEXUALITIES (1997).
62 Fejes, supra note 59, at 396.
63 Jack Drescher, Out of DSM: Depathologizing Homosexuality, BEHAV. SCI.
565, 565 (Dec. 4, 2015),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4695779/. For an engaging
history of how the APA did its historic about face on this issue, see 81 Words,
THIS AMERICAN LIFE (originally broadcast January 18, 2002) (available at
https://www.thisamericanlife.org/204/81-words).
56
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was then years ahead of its time. There was no GLAD,64
NCLR,65 or Lambda Legal.66 And even the ACLU had
comparatively little academic research, and almost no
legal precedent, upon which to base its advocacy. 67
In short, every one of the five “movers” (save the
activists alone) was either not helpful enough, or was
directly harmful, to the idea of same-sex marriage fortyseven years ago. Under the model above, the right was
barely at stage one. There was no institutional recognition
in mainstream society anywhere in the world. The
litigators of Baker v. Nelson, brave as they were, were
cramming a very large square peg into an infinitesimally
small round hole. The nation was, in a very real sense,
not ready yet.
Obergefell presented a completely different story,
discussed below.
A. Media
By 2015, because of the media’s attention to the
narratives told by activists and guided by advocacy/policy
organizations, America knew gays and lesbians. While
LGBT communities stayed mostly underground and out of
the news in the 1960s, beginning with the Stonewall
uprising in 196968 and into the 1970s, they garnered more
History, GAY AND LESBIAN ADVOCS. AND DEFENDERS,
https://www.glad.org/about/history/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).
65 About Us, NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RTS., http://www.nclrights.org/about-us/
(last visited Sept. 3, 2018).
66 Official condemnation by bar associations or other legal organizations
directed at attorneys seeking to represent lesbians and gay men is,
thankfully, scarce. However, on the topic of Lambda Legal, it is worth noting
that obtaining representation for LGBT issues prior to the 1990s was not
easy. Lambda Legal History, LAMBDA LEGAL,
https://www.lambdalegal.org/about-us/history (last visited Sept. 3, 2018)
(“Because of the overwhelming climate of prejudice against gay people, we
became our own first client: A panel of New York judges turned down our
application to be a nonprofit organization because, in their view, our mission
was ‘neither benevolent nor charitable.’” This is a testimony to the prejudice
against gays and lesbians present in the private bar at the time).
But see Burton v. Cascade School District, 353 F. Supp. 254 (D. Or. 1972),
aff'd 512 F.2d 850 (1975).
67 For an extensive account of “every civil case dealing with homosexuality”
up until 1999, along with a brief history of scientific research into sexuality,
see Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of
Homosexual Persons in the United States, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1015 (1999).
68 See Douglas Nejaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of
Nonmarital Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CAL. L. REV.
87, 95 (2014) (“After Stonewall, the radical politics of gay liberation became a
widespread animating principle of LGBT mobilization.”).
64
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serious coverage (though often derisive in tone, as in the
Wallace piece noted above).69 Four years after the Baker
decision, there were 262 gay or lesbian periodicals
nationwide.70 In addition, tragedy made gay people more
visible and humanized them to the rest of the world.
Brothers, sisters, sons, daughters, and friends died of
AIDS in the 1980s, forcing “the media to regard the gay
and lesbian community more seriously and in a different
light.”71 In the 1990s, there was Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,72
Will and Grace,73 and Ellen DeGeneres.74 Marriage
equality and anti-discrimination legislation became
serious national topics in the 2000s.
In 2013, Maurice Blanchard and Dominique James
were activists asserting a right that, although perhaps no
longer novel as an idea, was still counter-majoritarian in
Kentucky. They went to the county clerk’s office and

Fejes, supra note 59, at 403.
Id. at 403.
71 Id. at 404. One noted commentator has discussed the “Will & Grace” theory
of cultural change: “A mainstream television comedy featuring openly gay
characters demonstrated what social scientists have long known: the single
most important indicator of one’s support for gay rights is whether one knows
someone who is gay. In a pinch, it seems, a fellow on TV will do.” Dahlia
Lithwick, Extreme Makeover: The Story Behind the Story of Lawrence v.
Texas, NEW YORKER (Mar. 12, 2012),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/03/12/extreme-makeover-dahlialithwick.
72 “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” became official United States policy in American
military forces in December 1993 and was a national topic of conversation. 10
U.S.C. § 654 (2006) (repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111–321, 123 Stat. 3515. (2010)); see Bradford J. Kelley, The
Rainbow Sea Change: The Impact of Popular Culture on Homosexual Rights,
16 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. & SOC. JUST. 283, 331 (2014).
73 See generally Stacey L. Sobel, Culture Shifting at Warp Speed: How the
Law, Public Engagement, and Will & Grace Led to Social Change for LGBT
People, 89 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 143, 179 (2015) (citing Felicia Sonmez, Biden:
I’m ‘Absolutely Comfortable’ with Gay Couples Having Same Rights as
Straight Couples, WASH. POST (May 6, 2012, 10:14 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/post/biden-im-absolutelycomfortable-with-gay-couples-having-same-rights-as-straightcouples/2012/05/06/gIQA59Wg5T_blog.html (internal quotation marks
omitted) (“I think “Will and Grace” probably did more to educate the
American public [about LGBT people] than almost anything anybody’s ever
done so far . . . . And I think people fear that which is different. Now they’re
beginning to understand.”)).
74 “Public figures like Caitlyn Jenner, Laverne Cox, and Chaz Bono—I think
it helps, absolutely. Like Ellen DeGeneres for the gay community, who has
changed the world—you have to be glued to your prejudice to dislike Ellen
DeGeneres.” Deborah Kelly &, Jennifer C. Pizer, Department: On Direct:
Senior Counsel and Law and Policy Project National Director, Lambda Legal,
38 L.A. LAW. 8 (Dec. 2015); see also Sobel, supra note 73, at 180.
69
70

2019]

Marriage Equality and a Lawyer’s Role in the
Emergence of “New Rights”

230

demanded a marriage license.75 When the clerk informed
them that she could not legally issue a license to two men,
they refused to leave. They were arrested, prosecuted, and
fined one penny by a Louisville jury.76
Naturally, their act of defiance created media
uproar.77 And people talked. Why shouldn’t they have the
same rights as different-sex couples? What’s the
difference between this couple and any other couple? Who
gets hurt if they get married? And so on. People who had
never before thought of two men getting married asked
these questions at the dinner table. These questions,
fueled by stories like Maurice and Dominique’s, laid the
groundwork for marriage equality’s final shove from
partial to total institutional recognition.
Their prosecution was six months before United
States v. Windsor. Around a month after the Windsor
opinion, and seven months after Maurice and Dominique’s
prosecution, trench lawyers filed a lawsuit on behalf of
couples who had been married in states that recognized
same-sex marriage, seeking recognition of those
marriages by the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Judge
John Heyburn, a Republican appointee, issued a
thoughtful twenty-three-page opinion vindicating the
plaintiffs’ rights—rights that were scarcely worthy of
judicial discussion just a few decades prior.78 The opinion
begins by saying that “Kentucky’s denial of recognition for
valid same-sex marriages violates the United States
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection under the
law, even under the most deferential standard of
review.”79 The day before Valentine’s Day 2014, Time

See Andrew Wolfson, KY Gay Couple Fined 1 Cent In Fight For Marriage,
COURIER-JOURNAL & USA TODAY (Nov. 27, 2013, 9:23 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/27/kentucky-gaycouple-marriage-protest/3765599/.
76 Id.
77 See, e.g., id.; Gay Couple Who Protested For License Fined 1 Cent,
WHAS11.COM (Nov. 27, 2013, 5:14 PM),
https://www.whas11.com/article/news/local/gay-couple-who-protested-forlicense-fined-1-cent/417-266056181; Associated Press, Gay Couple Who
Protested for Ky. Marriage License Fined 1 Cent, LGBTQ NATION (Nov. 26,
2013), https://www.lgbtqnation.com/2013/11/gay-couple-who-protested-for-kymarriage-license-fined-1-cent/.
78 Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014), rev’d sub nom.
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
79 Bourke, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 544.
75
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magazine pronounced: “Kentucky Judge Turns Gay
Marriage Tide in the South.”80
Backlash to coverage of the Kentucky opinion was
so tepid as to be non-existent, especially compared to the
extreme reaction by many state legislatures following a
similar victory in Massachusetts just ten years earlier.81
This is mostly because by 2014, the broader public was
accustomed to the story. The idea of marriage equality
was no longer a far-fetched, fanciful, fringe idea but a
regular feature of daily American discourse. 82
After the victory in the recognition case, Maurice
and Dominique filed an intervening complaint asserting a
federal constitutional right to marriage equality.83 By the
time the Supreme Court agreed to hear Obergefell in
January 2015, more than sixty courts, including the
Kentucky district court, had declared marriage bans
unconstitutional, prompting near-ubiquitous media
coverage.84 By then, everyone in the country was asking
the questions Kentucky asked when Maurice and
Dominique were arrested. Even straight middleAmericans wanted to know: what’s the big deal?85

Michael A. Lindenberger, Kentucky Judge Turns Gay Marriage Tide in the
South, TIME (Feb. 13, 2014), http://nation.time.com/2014/02/13/kentuckyjudge-turns-gay-marriage-tide-in-the-south/. Note that the author takes no
position as to whether Kentucky is in fact “the south.”
81 Goodridge v. Dep’t Public Health, 798 N.E.2d at 969; COLE, supra note 31,
at 49.
82 For example, a Pew Research Center study of 500 news articles about
same-sex marriage in the months leading up to Windsor revealed that nearly
half of them reflected support for marriage equality in some way, while only
9% focused on opposition (the rest were considered neutral). Paul Hitlin, Amy
Mitchell & Mark Jurkowitz, News Coverage Conveys Strong Momentum for
Same-Sex Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (June 17, 2013),
http://www.journalism.org/2013/06/17/news-coverage-conveys-strongmomentum/. Perhaps more important here is that there were nearly 500
stories from major media outlets discussing same-sex marriage in a period of
less than three months. It would have been difficult for anyone in America to
escape this coverage.
83 See Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536 (W.D. Ky. 2014), rev'd sub nom.
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev'd sub nom. Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
84 COLE, supra note 31, at 87; see also note 82.
85 Indeed, support for marriage equality spiked in the years before Windsor
even among conservatives who were formerly staunchly opposed. See
Jonathan Merritt, If the Supreme Court Legalizes Gay Marriage in 2015, How
Will Evangelicals Respond?, RELIGION NEWS SERV. (Jan. 5, 2015),
https://religionnews.com/2015/01/05/supreme-court-legalizes-gay-marriage2015-will-evangelicals-respond/ (“From 2003 to 2013, support for gay
marriage among white evangelicals more than doubled, and support among
Catholics rose by 22 percentage points.”).
80
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B. Organizations
1972, the year of the Baker decision, turned out to
be a watershed year for LGBT advocacy groups. Parents
and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG) was formed
that same year.86 A year later, the National Gay Task
Force (now the National LGBTQ Task Force) was formed
and immediately set to work on establishing a nationwide
network of media organizations for the purpose of
“minimizing negative portrayals of homosexuals and
homosexuality.”87 As a result, “the National Association of
Broadcasters Code Authority agreed to interpret the NAB
Code to guarantee that gays and lesbians would be fairly
treated.”88 This began the critical process, noted above, of
slowly introducing LGBT people to the broader American
public, as gay and lesbian characters began to appear (as
something other than foil or antagonist) on sitcoms and
prime-time dramas.89
More advocacy organizations were formed over the
next few decades; many with a focus on lesbians and gay
men and, over time, a few with a particular focus on
marriage equality. For example, the Human Rights
Campaign Fund PAC, now commonly known as HRC, was
formed in 198090; by the early 2000s, its membership had
bloomed to around 500,000 members.91 In 2012, HRC’s
Executive Director resigned to co-chair President Obama’s
campaign for re-election92 —a testament to the influence
of LGBT advocacy groups on governing institutions by the
time Windsor was decided. Also in 1973, Lambda Legal
was founded as the nation’s first legal organization
dedicated to LGBT equality.93 Another major legal
Bonnie J. Morris, History of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
Social Movements, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N,
http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/history.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).
87 Fejes, supra note 59, at 401.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Our History, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/hrc-story/about-us
(last visited July 30, 2018).
91 Emily Althafer, Leading Gay Rights Advocate to Speak at U.F., U. FLA.
NEWS (Jan. 23, 2006), http://news.ufl.edu/archive/2006/01/leading-gay-rightsadvocate-to-speak-at-uf.html.
92 Byron Tau, Obama Campaign Announces Co-Chairs, POLITICO (Feb. 22,
2012, 6:32 AM), https://www.politico.com/blogs/politico44/2012/02/obamacampaign-announces-co-chairs-115161.
93 Lambda Legal History, LAMBDA LEGAL, https://www.lambdalegal.org/aboutus/history (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).
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organization, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, was
formed four years later.94 In 2003, a Lambda Lawyer,
Evan Wolfson, who litigated the Hawaii case in the 1990s,
formed an advocacy group solely focused on achieving
marriage equality.95 And of course, the ACLU’s efforts on
behalf of LGBT people burgeoned from the 1970s through
the 2010s, in both the courtroom and on the ground.
These groups, with the help of private lawyers, lost a few
marriage cases96 but, as discussed above, began making
intermittent progress in the 1990s.
As discussed by Cole, another important aspect of
the fight for marriage equality is that shortly after the
sparse few judicial victories in various states, ballot
initiatives on marriage equality—spearheaded by
advocacy organizations—started to succeed all over the
country.97 To be sure, the successes were preceded by
legislative and popular backlash. Twenty-seven states
amended their constitutions in response to the judicial
victory the Goodridge case realized in Massachusetts.98
One of these states was Kentucky, which saw a
referendum defining marriage between “one man and one
woman” handily approved by 75% of voters in 2004.99
At the time, these amendments seemed to be a
setback for the movement. An especially painful blow was
dealt in California with the passing of Proposition 8,
which prohibited recognition of same-sex marriage in the
state.100 If marriage equality could not be recognized by
one of the most liberal states in the country through a
Mission & History, NCLR, http://www.nclrights.org/about-us/missionhistory/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).
95 Winning the Freedom to Marry Nationwide: The Inside Story of a
Transformative Campaign Freedom to Marry, FREEDOM TO MARRY,
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/how-it-happened (last visited Feb. 1,
2019).
96 See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1036
(9th Cir. 1982); Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, 206
Ariz. 276, 278 (Ct. App. 2003); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973);
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
97 COLE, supra note 31, at 64–65.
98Id. at 49.
99 Kentucky, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., UNIV. S. CAL. GOULD SCH. OF L.,
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/states/state.cfm?id=36 (last visited Sept. 3,
2018).
100 California Proposition 8, the “Eliminates Right of Same-Sex Couples to
Marry” Initiative (2008), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_8,_the_%22Eliminates_Right_o
f_Same-Sex_Couples_to_Marry%22_Initiative_(2008) (last visited Sept. 3,
2018).
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popular vote, how was there to be any hope of winning it
nationwide? But all the attention garnered by these ballot
initiatives carried two very important consequences.
First, the losses strengthened both the resolve and the
resources of organizations and individual leaders working
to rally people around the issue of LGBT rights generally.
Second, the extensive mainstream coverage of story after
story on gay and lesbian families between the late 1990s
through the early 2010s, which, as noted above, had
become considerably more sympathetic to the LGBT
movement, humanized those families to a broad base of
media consumers.
All four states involved in Obergefell had at least
one lawyer from the ACLU, Lambda Legal, NCLR, or
GLAD representing plaintiff couples. These lawyers
brought with them the decades of diverse, strategic, and
focused experience garnered by their respective
organizations.
C. Academics
The academics played no small part in the cultural
shift in favor of marriage equality. Immediately after
Baker, the topic of same-sex marriage became an item of
interest to legal scholars, who now had a jurisprudential
“hook.” In 1973, the Yale Law Journal published a note
making an extensive argument in favor of marriage
equality.101 By 1996, noted Ivy League academics had
published entire books devoted to the theory and practice
of marriage equality.102 In addition, the APA had by then
“rejected the stigma of mental illness that the medical
and mental health professions had previously placed on
sexual minorities.”103
As part of Michigan’s marriage litigation, the
plaintiffs submitted the testimony of six expert witnesses,
including professors at Yale, Stanford, and Harvard.104 In

Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973).
See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE:
FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996); See EVAN WOLFSON,
WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS (2004).
103 REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO
SEXUAL ORIENTATION, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N 11 (Aug. 2009),
https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/therapeutic-response.pdf.
104 See generally Case Profile: DeBoer v. Snyder, CIV. RTS. LITIG.
CLEARINGHOUSE, U. MICH. L. SCH.,
101
102
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contrast, the closest thing Michigan could get to a star
witness—Mark Regnerus—had been so totally discredited
by mainstream sociologists that it actually tipped the
scales in the plaintiffs’ favor.105 As one amicus put it, the
“scientific and medical consensus” debunking same-sex
attraction as a social or mental illness had “become widely
accepted over the past decades, to the point where there is
so ‘great an analytical gap between the data and the
opinion proffered’” that its scholarly opponents often
“would not qualify to testify as expert witnesses.”106
Because the academic consensus was so broad, it became
difficult for even the most curmudgeonly of jurists to
ignore it.
Academics contributed directly to the Obergefell
case before the Supreme Court.107 The Petitioners’ briefs
in Obergefell, as well as those of the amici, demonstrated
a synthesis of a diverse range of disciplines, from
sociology to biology, history to religion; they are the
quintessence of the Brandeis brief108 (that is, a brief that
asks “courts to take judicial notice of social facts,
primarily to provide justification for challenges to
https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12811 (last visited Sept. 3,
2018).
105 Statement from the Chair Regarding Professor Regnerus, U. TEX. AUSTIN C.
LIBERAL ARTS (Apr. 12, 2014),
https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/sociology/news/article.php/sociology/news/7572?i
d=7572 (in which Regnerus’ own institution notes that his research does not
“reflect the views of the American Sociological Association, which takes the
position that the conclusions he draws from his study of gay parenting are
fundamentally flawed on conceptual and methodological grounds and that
findings from Dr. Regnerus’ work have been cited inappropriately in efforts to
diminish the civil rights and legitimacy of LBGTQ partners and their
families”); Roberta A. Kaplan, “It’s All About Edie, Stupid”: Lessons from
Litigating United States v. Windsor, 29 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 85, 95 (2015)
(Regnerus had been thoroughly discredited by the time Windsor was argued.
“[T]he American Sociological Association, in its amicus brief submitted to the
Supreme Court, condemned his work in no uncertain terms, stating that it
‘provides no support for the conclusions that same-sex-parents are inferior
parents.’”).
106 Brief for Survivors of Sexual Orientation Change Therapies as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)
(No. 14-556), at 5 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)),
http://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/2015.03.04.-Survivorsof-Sexual-Orientation-Change-Therapies-Amicus.pdf.
107 Kentucky’s proposed oralist on the question of licensure was professor
Jeffrey L. Fisher of the Stanford University Law School. See Love v.
Kentucky, INFORMAVORE.MEDIA, http://informavore.media/projects/love-vkentucky/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).
108 Party Briefs on the Merits, U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/ObergefellHodges/PartyBriefs/ (last visited
Sept. 3, 2018).
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legislation”).109 These briefs could not have been written
in the 1970s or 80s.
D. Activists
Emboldened by a strengthening media presence
and the increasing clout of advocacy organizations,
outspoken individual activists grew in number and
influence from the 1970s on. In 1979, the first march on
Washington, D.C. for gay rights occurred, organized by a
loose confederation of prominent activists (including
Harvey Milk before his assassination).110 Another march
in 1993, organized by the then twenty-year-old National
Gay (and Lesbian) Task Force,111 boasted as many as one
million supporters.112 These grassroots activists had years
before planted the seeds of success for Obergefell, albeit
primarily in discrete corners of the Northeast and
California. In Vermont, for example, a concerted effort
was made to teach gay and lesbian activists “to tell their
own stories effectively,” and to put those stories (and
stories of the activists themselves) in the homes of people
who were undecided on marriage equality.113 These efforts
curtailed the ability of lawmakers to do what lawmakers
did in so many states in the early 2000s, i.e., introduce
state constitutional amendments restricting marriage to
being between a man and a woman.114 Gay and lesbian
couples, now humanized, could no longer be seen as the
sharp-fanged closet monsters voters’ parents had warned
them about.
The efforts of these activists, and their narratives,
made a big difference in legal landscapes. But Kentucky
Judith A. McMorrow, Moving from a Brandeis Brief to a Brandeis Law
Firm: Challenges and Opportunities for Holistic Legal Services in the United
States, 33 TOURO L. REV. 259, 262 (2017).
110 Morris, supra note 86.
111 The name had by then been changed from the National Gay Task Force.
About Mission and History, NAT’L LGBTQ TASK FORCE,
http://www.thetaskforce.org/about/mission-history.html (last visited January
23, 2019). For a thorough history of these marches, see AMIN GHAZIANI, THE
DIVIDENDS OF DISSENT: HOW CONFLICT AND CULTURE WORK IN LESBIAN AND
GAY MARCHES ON WASHINGTON (2008).
112 Id.; Morris, supra note 86.
113 COLE, supra note 31, at 37.
114 See, e.g., Megan Moore, The Money Behind the 2006 Marriage
Amendments, THE INST. ON MONEY IN ST. POL. (July 23, 2007),
https://www.followthemoney.org/research/institute-reports/the-moneybehind-the-2006-marriage-amendments.
109
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(and most of the Midwest/South) did not benefit from the
efforts of activists or organizations in the way that the
coasts did, as evidenced by the overwhelming number of
votes on the 2004 Federal Marriage Amendment.115 As
such, in 2013, Kentucky trench lawyers had a
constitutional amendment to deal with, and no
organizational support because Kentucky did not figure
into the plan of the national organizations that had been
working on marriage for years. And while the
organizations were right—plaintiffs lost at the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, after all116—no one could have
foreseen the dramatic shift in popular and judicial
thinking that occurred nationwide in the two years
following Windsor. Were it not for emboldened activists—
quite separate and independent from advocacy
organizations—at the state level, Kentucky’s legal team
might have had no clients at all, and the “tide turning”
described by Time might never have occurred.
E. The Movers Working in Concert
One example of an observable, real-time impact on
a major institution (the Executive Branch) made by a
concerted effort of at least three of our five movers (an
individual activist, the media, and an advocacy
organization) is recounted by Cole, who describes how the
media was activated on a specific instance of LGBT
discrimination in a meaningful way some four years
before Windsor.117 In 2009, the Obama Administration
filed a brief in a DOMA case in California which likened
same-sex marriage regulation to legal restrictions on
marriages for minors and between first cousins,
prompting one activist blogger to write “Holy cow, Obama
invoked incest and people marrying children.”118
The charge got picked up by ABC News, and the
following day, Joe Solmonese, president of
Human Rights Campaign, wrote President
Obama, saying, “I cannot overstate the pain
that we feel as human beings and as families
See Kentucky, supra note 99.
See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014).
117 See COLE, supra note 31, at 41, 84–86.
118 Id. at 85.
115
116
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when we read an argument, presented in
federal court, implying that our own marriages
have no more constitutional standing than
incestuous ones.” The New York Times followed
up four days later with an editorial condemning
the administration for its defense of DOMA. . .
.radar. After much internal wrangling, the
administration did what Bonauto, Wolfson, and
many others had asked: it took the position that
heightened scrutiny should apply to DOMA,
and that it could not defend the law under such
scrutiny.119
There are no doubt countless other examples of this model
at work on both microcosmic and macrocosmic levels; in
other words, it can work for individual practitioners in
both the short and the long run.
In 2015, two-and-a-half years after being arrested,
Maurice and Dominique were lawfully wedded in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky.120 Just four decades after
Baker v. Nelson, the same Court decided that not only
was marriage equality something worthy of the Court’s
time, but that a bona fide constitutional right existed
where none had before.121 While litigation ultimately
drove the final nail into the coffin of marriage
discrimination, it was a dramatic shift in attitudes that
was truly responsible for its demise.122 And that shift in
attitudes was not brought about solely by brass-tacks
litigation, not by a longshot.123 Rather it was this
Id.at 85–86.
See Roberto Roldan, Once Jailed, Gay Couple Gets Marriage License,
COURIER J. (last updated June 30, 2015, 3:29 PM), https://www.courierjournal.com/story/news/local/2015/06/29/jailed-gay-couple-gets-marriagelicense/29488461/.
121 See Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), overruled by Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
122 See Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (June 26, 2017),
http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/.
123 “[D]o not celebrate the Constitution. It had nothing to do with it.”
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Interestingly, and in
contrast, the original Bourke opinion in Kentuky acknowledges the dramatic
changes from Baker to Windsor, but remains focused almost solely on
jurisprudential development within the courts, as opposed to outside forces
which undeniably shaped that development. District Judge John Heyburn
wrote:
[J]udicial thinking on this issue has evolved ever so slowly.
That is because courts usually answer only the questions that
come before it. Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes aptly described
119
120
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combination of activists, media, academics, and advocacy
organizations that allowed the coup de grace to be
effectively delivered in court. Obergefell therefore
presents a model of how all five movers can manage to
effect institutional changes.
VI. PUTTING THIS MODEL TO WORK: A LAWYER’S
ROLE
This model for advancing emerging rights is a
crude one. It should be dissected, explored, and refined.124
And there are, no doubt, readers who will say, “yes of
course, this is how movements work.” But the question is:
how many practicing lawyers consciously use these
elements to achieve a goal? The likely answer, especially
for private lawyers who represent individuals every day,
is very few. Private lawyers tend to develop tunnel vision
in the pursuit of justice for one or more clients in a
particular situation, but in the process, typically do not
use any sort of “big picture” models, and thus may miss
opportunities to effectuate change on a larger basis.
The great social engineers of our time have
engaged these five “movers,” consciously or otherwise, for
as long as rights have existed. Charles Hamilton Houston,
a chief architect of the legal desegregation movement,
famously stated:
A lawyer’s either a social engineer or . . . a
parasite on society. . . . A social engineer [is] a
highly skilled, perceptive, sensitive lawyer who
[understands] the Constitution of the United
States and [knows] how to explore its uses in
this process: “[J]udges do and must legislate, but they can do so
only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular
motions.” S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). In Romer, Lawrence, and finally,
Windsor, the Supreme Court has moved interstitially, as
Holmes said it should, establishing the framework of cases from
which district judges now draw wisdom and inspiration. Each
of these small steps has led to this place and this time, where
the right of same-sex spouses to the state-conferred benefits of
marriage is virtually compelled.
Bourke, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 557.
124 See Arkles, supra note 52, at 612–13 (referring to various models for
transformative social justice, most of which, it must be said, are at least as
abstract as this one).
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the solving of problems of local communities
and
in
bettering
conditions
of
the
125
underprivileged citizens.
His ideas were reified by perhaps the greatest
social engineer of the twentieth century: Justice Thurgood
Marshall. Evan Wolfson, the founder of Freedom to
Marry, is one of the more well-known and articulate
champions of this holistic method of litigation. The
attorneys of the Sylvia Rivera Law Project are among the
leaders of the current legal movement for trans rights and
are outspoken about the need for litigators to observe
principles that are both interdisciplinary and
intersectional.126 The modest idea advanced in this article
is that lawyers—all of us—should use these movers
consciously and deliberately.
A practitioner who seeks to change a law in the
manner described here should develop a plan to do so that
involves more than just filing documents with a court.
Such a plan should involve active coordination with the
other four movers. The question should be asked: how can
academics, the media, advocacy organizations, and
activists play a role in this case?
For example, vis-à-vis the activist community, a
practitioner serves the important role of bridging; that is,
connecting inherently insular groups with broader society
and particularly with the institutions that have no reason
to recognize them or their asserted rights. This can be a
formidable challenge, because “[t]he stronger the identity
and cohesion of the group, the more likely its members
are to become alienated from other groups, and from
society as a whole.”127 But “without strong external
bridging, the group will become too insular and isolated to
forge the kind of broad alliances that are essential to
winning meaningful changes in society.”128 This isolation
can be dangerous, and not just to the group itself.129
OUR HISTORY, HOWARD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW,
http://www.law.howard.edu/19 (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).
126 See Arkles, supra note 52, passim.
127 SMUCKER, supra note 53, at 96.
128 Id. at 98.
129 Smucker provides a number of anecdotes regarding the tendency of
activist groups to “encapsulate”—that is, to “develop an ideology that is
internally coherent but virtually unintelligible to recruits and outsiders who
do not share all of the members’ assumptions”—often with disastrous results.
See id. at 83, citing Frederick D. Miller, The End of SDS and the Emergence
125
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Lawyers¾especially civil rights lawyers¾are tasked with
disrupting the process of self-reinforcing insularity that
tends to occur within grassroots groups and bringing the
needs of these groups to the attention of power structures
in safe, socially acceptable ways (such as litigation).130
And perhaps more importantly, well-meaning lawyers
who jump into litigation of rights without first hearing
from a sufficient number of activists fighting for those
rights may contravene the work of the larger movement
in ways that they could not anticipate.131
Indeed, while activists and those seeking to assert
new rights may be “outsiders” in relation to governing
power structures, lawyers are necessarily “insiders.” They
are, in essence, constantly seeking to institutionalize
ideas. The idea may be as simple as “my client is right
and yours is wrong.” But when a judge puts that in an
order, the idea becomes institutionalized. And the
proposition that the sort of ideas we are responsible for
institutionalizing can actually have an impact beyond
one’s own clients should not be controversial. How are
those ideas crafted? With careless, blunt-force litigation,
or with purposefulness?132

of the Weatherman: Demise through Success, in WAVES OF PROTEST: SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS SINCE THE SIXTIES, 307 (Jo Freeman & Victoria Johnson eds.,
1999). Ideally, “alternative narratives” will be “oriented to connect with
broader bases of society” in order to combat encapsulation and ultimately to
attain institutional acceptance. SMUCKER, supra note 53, at 85.
130 See Arkles, supra note 52, at 602. “Lawyers often have an easier time
getting meetings with decision makers precisely because we are seen as more
‘reasonable,’ i.e., amenable to the status quo, and we are too often tempted to
accept this access rather than insisting on solidarity with more radical
leaders from affected communities.” The individual lawyer should be mindful
of this, but there is no reason why solidarity with the oppressed must be
mutually exclusive with institutional access. Indeed, providing access-byproxy to the oppressed is the civil rights lawyer’s raison d’etre.
131 See id. at 597. “Lawyers acting on what they believe to be best for a
marginalized community without taking leadership from that community will
often fail to generate the most effective solutions and may actually propose
counterproductive solutions.”
132 See id. at 581–82. Arkles, et al., make a separate but important point
about the need for lawyers and academics to involve grassroots activists. “If
the problems faced by our communities are rooted in and enforced by the
legal system, then meaningful change would have to come from outside of it.”
Id. The authors note well-meaning participation in “roundtables, conferences,
and law school symposia, where lawyers may identify, discuss, adopt, and
pursue various strategies for advancing the rights of queer and trans people.
However, all too often, these spaces exclude nonlawyers from participation
and these spaces recreate the very forms of oppression we must dismantle to
achieve social justice.” Id.
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In addition, trench lawyers can (and should) do a
lot more communicating with universities, when
appropriate. Law schools often want to be members of the
legal community in their own right, not just diploma
mills. Litigators should help them do just that. Academics
should make an effort to create content for practitioners
that is both realistic in its scope and readily available,
and practitioners must make an effort to use that content
whenever possible. Citations to law or social-science
journal articles are an unfortunate rarity in day-to-day
practice. 133
Similarly, organizations should not exclude
individual litigators any more than litigators should
discard broader organizational goals. A collaborative
relationship between advocacy organizations (which tend
to be micro-focused and short-staffed), and private
lawyers (who tend to have more flexible resources and a
diversified portfolio of social contacts), can be
advantageous.
Cultivating media contact is also something that is
often overlooked, but vitally important in civil rights
cases. The way in which a proponent of a right packages a
message is often the way the media will present it. And
the way in which it is presented may determine its
success, at least in the short run.134
The peculiar wall between academia and boots-on-the-ground lawyering is
beyond the scope of this article, but its existence is widely acknowledged by
academics and lawyers alike. See, e.g., the in-depth discussion of related
issues in Transcript—Conference on the Ethics of Legal Scholarship, 101
MARQ. L. REV. 1084, 1138 (2017) in which Professor Carissa Hessick states: “I
actually think that there are some virtues of the law review model. And one
of the virtues that I see is it allows us to have a format for work that should
be of interest to a more general audience. To the extent that we do want
lawyers or judges to pay attention to what we do, I think it is helpful to have
that format. And I understand that it's contestable about whether we
want lawyers and judges to pay attention to what we do.” (emphasis
added).
134 Of course, prudence counsels caution in using the media as a litigation
tool. ABA Model Rule 3.6 states:
A lawyer who is participating or has participated in
the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not
make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated
by means of public communication and will have a
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
adjudicative proceeding in the matter.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). An
entire textbook could be written about what this rule means in the context of
impact litigation. Suffice it to say that it is unlikely that a lawyer should
133
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Regardless of where one fits into the big picture of
furthering rights, it is critical to know the right problem
solvers. The civil litigator should therefore forge
relationships not just with activists, journalists, and
organizational leaders, but also with criminal defense
lawyers, domestic relations lawyers, and anyone else who
has an up-close, daily audience with people whose rights
are likely to be endangered.
VII. DO ONLY FOOLS RUSH IN?
One final note: counterintuitively, in employing
this model, there may be a certain danger in thinking too
much about the big picture. Cole counsels that “cautious
incrementalism” is “often essential” in approaching major
changes to constitutional law.135 This is also a common
sentiment among seasoned impact litigators. The fear of
getting a bad ruling likely stems from the supposition
that the courts should be on the vanguard of most issues,
when in reality they are often the last stop.136 But an
examination of history reveals that, while a degree of
caution is obviously warranted, a premature pulling of the
pin on the social grenade, at least in the judicial realm,
need to say anything to the media aside from what appears in the public
record, and if more need be said, a client may say it herself.
135 COLE, supra note 31, at 43.
136 Legislatures tend to be less progressive than the courts, but legislatures
need not fit into this model at all, and need not be a point of comparison—
they are in many cases the very last place to recognize rights. In the opinion
reversing the Kentucky district court in the marriage equality case, Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jeffrey Sutton framed the marriage case as “a
debate about whether to allow the democratic processes begun in the States
to continue in the four States of the Sixth Circuit or to end them now by
requiring all States in the Circuit to extend the definition of marriage to
encompass gay couples.” DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 396.
Respectfully, from a constitutional and jurisprudential perspective,
no court case involving individual rights is about “the democratic process.”
Were it otherwise, our understanding of rights in the United States would be
profoundly different. Take, for example, the referendum held in 2000—thirtythree years after Loving v. Virginia—in which a full 40% of Alabama voters
voted to retain the state constitution’s prohibition on interracial marriage.
See Judith E. Schaeffer, Alabama Shows Why Civil Rights Shouldn’t Be Put
to a Popular Vote, SLATE (June 12, 2015) https://slate.com/humaninterest/2015/06/gay-marriage-alabama-shows-why-civil-rights-shouldnt-beput-to-popular-vote.html. This sobering statistic underscores the importance
of constitutional litigation apart from a purely democratic process; it is
rendered even more confounding in light of the fact that the Alabama
Supreme Court had unanimously held anti-miscegenation laws
unconstitutional over a hundred years before Loving. See Burns v. State, 48
Ala. 195 (Ala. 1872).
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often does not cause as much destruction as one might
fear.137
Take, for example, the time between Bowers v.
Hardwick in 1986, upholding sodomy laws, and Lawrence
v. Texas in 2003, pronouncing such laws unconstitutional.
This seventeen-year delay seems catastrophic at first
glance, but progress on LGBT rights overall improved
exponentially in the years after Bowers. This progress can
even be seen at the Supreme Court level. Romer v. Evans,
a decisive win for the LGBT community, held that states
could not categorically prohibit legislation that protected
people based on sexual orientation. This case was decided
just ten years after Bowers.138
By 2003, only four states had sodomy laws that
applied only to persons of the same sex.139 Prosecutions
under these laws were extremely rare. The ACLU
acknowledges that “Lawrence v. Texas is one of a mere
handful of cases since the American revolution involving
two adults—straight or gay—actually prosecuted for
being intimate in private.”140 Even the plaintiffs in
Lawrence denied having engaged in the conduct they were
prosecuted for, but “[s]ince Bowers, no other test case had
emerged in which someone was actually arrested for
violating a state sodomy law.”141 While undoubtedly
helpful to LGBT rights overall, the victory in Lawrence
was more symbolic than practical (as was the loss in
Bowers). And the impact of this symbolic victory was
strengthened by an explicit overruling—and sharp
criticism—of Bowers by the Lawrence justices.142
Consider the forty-three year span between Baker
v. Nelson and Obergefell. Perhaps Baker was prematurely
filed, but was it truly a setback for the LGBT movement?
If so, it was so slight as to be of no consequence. Baker
was not treated as serious precedent by the Court in the
Obergefell opinion, nor in oral argument.143 Even if one
See, e.g., Andrew Simmonds, Amah and Eved and the Origin of Legal
Rights, 46 S.D. L. REV. 516, 517 (2001). Rights tend to develop “not out of
lengthy progress or historical development, but rather from relatively brief,
abrupt, discontinuous episodes. Not based upon plans, ideas or logic.”
138 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
139 See Why Sodomy Laws Matter, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/whysodomy-laws-matter (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).
140 Id.
141 Lithwick, supra note 71.
142 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
143 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598.
137
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were to imagine that Baker contained any meaningful
constitutional analysis whatsoever, the difference in
cultural norms would almost surely have led the Supreme
Court to explicitly overrule it by 2015, as they had done
with Bowers in Lawrence. It is far more likely that the
news made by the Baker case contributed to the overall
national conversation.144 It may be purely coincidence
that the NGTF, Lambda Legal, and NCLR were all
formed, and that the APA removed same-sex attraction as
a mental illness, all almost immediately after Baker, but
it seems more likely that there is at least some connection
between these events.
Looking to another era, the NAACP’s “block by
block, precedent upon precedent” approach to
desegregation in the first half of the twentieth century led
to victory in Brown v. Board¾ but it was a close call.145 A
bid for public school desegregation before the Supreme
Court in the 1930s would surely have failed, but would
this failure have set the movement back decades? If we
are to draw any lessons from Bowers/Lawrence or
Baker/Obergefell, it would seem not. And when the
NAACP’s legal strategy began to be successfully
implemented, Plessy v. Ferguson was not quite forty years
old.146 In any event, “[t]he notion that Brown was the first
case to consider the constitutionality of the segregation of
public schools is, of course, fictitious. In many early cases
the lawyers tried, perhaps ineptly, to argue that
segregation was unconstitutional.”147
On the other hand, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court’s ruling in Goodridge, which was achieved through
“cautious incrementalism,” resulted in immediate,

In fact, Jack Baker is such an intelligent activist that he managed to keep
national media coverage going for months after his unremarkable loss in the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Homosexual Wins Fight to Take Bar Examination
in Minnesota, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 1973),
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/01/07/archives/homosexual-wins-fight-to-takebar-examination-in-minnesota-marriage.html.
145 Simmonds, supra note 137, at 610, 616.
146 See id. at 610–11.
147 Id. at 616. In a similar vein, “those cases or statutes that appear to result
in extraordinary victories for marginalized groups typically translate into
little positive change . . . scholars and activists have pointed out that despite
the momentous legal victory of Brown v. Board of Education, 76 public
schools remain segregated with white children receiving much more
resources and higher quality education than black children.” Arkles, supra
note 52, at 597 n.77.
144
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observable backlash.148 This backlash was nationwide—
including in Kentucky—despite the fact that Goodridge
only affected residents of Massachusetts. Forty-five states
took steps to pronounce any union not between one man
and one woman a nullity.149 Cole criticizes Hawaii’s Baehr
v. Lewin opinion as an example of “taking too large a step
[and resulting in] substantial negative repercussions,”150
but it is difficult to see how those repercussions were any
more negative than those suffered in the wake of
Goodridge.
Cole recognizes that “[i]n a long-term campaign for
constitutional reform, losses can be as productive as
victories.”151 Though he is referring primarily to ballot
initiatives, the same can be said of losses in the courts.
However, for whatever reason, activists often perceive the
latter to be more disastrous than the former. For example,
Cole discusses the trepidation in filing a challenge to
Proposition 8 in the wake of the “painfully long” delay
between Bowers and Lawrence.152 Of the Proposition 8
COLE, supra note 31, at 49–51.
See id. at 49.
150 Id. at 43.
151 Id. at 75.
152 COLE, supra note 31, at 79. Cole discusses Professors Rosenberg and
Klarman’s view that “the nationwide backlash that Goodridge sparked was
‘nothing short of disastrous for the right to same-sex marriage.’” (citing
Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster: Looking for Change in All the Wrong
Places, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 795, 812 (2005); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow
Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? U. OF CHI. PRESS, 343 (2008);
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME SEX MARRIAGE 105–106 (2013); John D’Emilio, The
Marriage Fight is Setting Us Back, GAY & LESBIAN REV. WORLDWIDE 10
(November-December 2006)). If one takes the position that such cases should
not be litigated at all (and some do, see e.g., Rosenberg, supra) perhaps this
makes sense. Otherwise, it is difficult to see the sense in decrying both losses
and victories in the courts as counterproductive.
It is perhaps worth noting, however, that a victory for marriage
advocates may have been more disastrous than a loss had it come from the
United States Supreme Court early on, as it may have spurred conservatives
and centrists to more vigorous attempts at passage of a federal constitutional
amendment defining marriage—something that was pushed by President
George W. Bush and others in the early 2000s. See, e.g., David Stout, Bush
Backs Ban in Constitution on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2004),
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/24/politics/bush-backs-ban-in-constitutionon-gay-marriage.html. One could argue that this push was due in part to
Goodridge, but still came to naught. To the contrary, Goodridge and
Obergefell counsel Mary Bonauto “was confident [that if a victory could be
won in court], people would see for themselves that there were no negative
effects on families, local communities, or society more broadly, and the fear
and opposition would dissipate.” COLE, supra note 32, at 45. She was right.
Once the bell of a right like that of marriage has been rung in America, it is
difficult to unring.
148
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litigation which became Perry v. Schwarzenegger,153 Cole
notes the following:
No other federal suits were pending when
[David] Boies and [Ted] Olson filed theirs. And
while they could not guarantee that no one else
would file, [organizational counsel] Wolfson,
Bonauto, Coles, Davidson, and many others
had repeatedly talked couples and lawyers out
of filing when the time or place was not right.
They felt that they could continue to do so. But
they couldn’t dissuade Boies and Olson.154
In other words, private lawyers pushed the movement
forward even when the movement didn’t want to go. Until
then, advocacy organizations “had been carefully pursuing
an incremental state-by-state strategy, intentionally
avoiding federal claims in order to keep the issue out of
federal court” because only four states recognized samesex marriage.155
Perry turned out for the best (as did Obergefell), but
could it have led to disaster? Maybe, but given the solid
reinforcement provided by our five movers over the
decades elapsed since Baker, it seems unlikely. As Cole
notes, “In retrospect, however, like Goodridge, the
Proposition 8 loss was the catalyst that pushed marriage
equality down the road[.]”156 Similarly, one could credibly
argue that Perry—won or lost—might have moved the
needle in favor of marriage equality. A critically
important aspect of major operations, both electoral and
judicial, appears to be not just that those operations are
successful, but that they start the right kind of
conversations, thus bringing about the cultural changes
necessary to achieve institutional recognition. Social
movement scholars appear to be generally in agreement
on this point.157
COLE, supra note 31, at 79.
Id. at 60–61.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 59.
157 Id. at 69; see also Megan S. Wright, End of Life and Autonomy: The Case
for Relational Nudges in End-Of-Life Decision-Making Law and Policy, 77
MD. L. REV. 1062, 1135 (2018). “And with regard to changing the culture of
avoidance around death and dying, it is likely more feasible to change the
structure—laws and policies—than to try to enact widespread cultural and
psychological change. In fact, it is through changing the structure that
153
154
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All this serves to underscore the fundamental
difference between the goals of organizational litigators,
and litigators who represent solely the interests of
individual clients (the trench lawyers). The tension
between the goals of organizations and the goals of trench
lawyers can be helpful more often than harmful. Lawyers
seeking justice for an individual client tend to be less
cognizant of the fragility of social movements writ large;
organizational lawyers tend to underestimate the
strength and resilience of those same movements, in spite
of (or even because of) judicial losses. This ostensible
conflict often creates a powerful synthesis, as seen in
Perry.158
Consider also that litigation victories almost
universally produce backlash. This is true whether the
backlash is a result of a case won by incrementalism, like
Goodridge, or by surprise, like Perry or Baehr. Especially
in the case of Goodridge, the immediate effects of the
cultural changes in this realm may become possible; that is, changing law
and policy may normalize conversations about end of life, which may
decrease avoidance of discussions of death and dying.”
It should be noted that Maurice and Dominique probably did not
expect to win their trial any more than Susan B. Anthony and Sojourner
Truth did when they went to trial for illegal voting in 1872. United States v.
Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829 (N.D.N.Y. 1873). As plainly evidenced by Anthony’s
famous speech to the court at her sentencing, victory at trial was not the goal:
“May it please the Court to remember that since the day of my arrest last
November, this is the first time that either myself or any person of my
disfranchised class has been allowed a word of defense before judge
or jury.” See Remarks by Susan B. Anthony in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Northern District of New York, 19 June 1873, THE
ELIZABETH CADY STANTON & SUSAN B. ANTHONY PAPERS PROJECT,
http://ecssba.rutgers.edu/docs/sbatrial.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2019)
(emphasis added). The opportunity to speak at length, to a larger audience in
the context of a well-publicized case, about the injustice visited upon women
in the nineteenth century, was rare indeed. Anthony seized that opportunity,
even when there was no realistic hope of a verdict in her favor.
158 Arkles, supra note 52, at 597 (noting that “[a]s parties in a lawsuit,
individuals or small groups do not have the same opportunities they have in
community organizing to share and learn from other people’s experiences,
build political analysis, and develop solutions dynamically with others from
their community”). This is undoubtedly true, but may not necessarily be all
bad. Many of the plaintiffs in Obergefell had not been involved in LGBT
activism at all, at least not in any formal way. The same is true of the
plaintiffs in Lawrence. These litigants lacked the political savvy of movement
work veterans, but also the prejudices and preconceptions that can also come
with that work. We should, of course, not deign to know what is right or
wrong for the community or movements as a whole, but an individual
lawyer’s first duty is to her client, and working with an individual client to
solve a problem can provide a microfocus on aspects of that problem which
are often missed by larger organizations (as noted by the activist-scholars).
Id.
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backlash from an incremental win would seem to be worse
than, or at least on a par with, the consequences of a loss.
And like losses, as Cole observes, “backlash can be
productive.”159 Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight, it is
not clear that cautious incrementalism in civil rights
litigation has affected the development of rights any more
or less than rushing into battle. To avoid litigation on the
basis of fear of backlash, therefore, may only serve to
delay justice. This is especially so today (as opposed to
100 years ago) when one accounts for the increased pace
of communication, and therefore the increased pace at
which rights are recognized. In the era of Brown or Baker,
it could take days for word of a loss to spread; now it
takes only seconds, and seconds more for activists to
mobilize in response.160
Indeed, for those on the farthest fringes, the only
way to stoke the fire of a would-be right may be to assert
that right in a court of law and lose. The media, the
legislature, the executive branch, advocacy
organizations—none of these are obligated to hear the
grievances of an individual or a group who seek to
establish a new right. The courts, however, are built for
just such a purpose. Even a curt, dismissive decision like
the one in Baker starts conversations that would not
likely occur otherwise.161
Still, it must be acknowledged that there is a
serious danger in presenting a bad narrative which could
further reinforce stereotypes or otherwise sway public
COLE, supra note 31, at 50; see also Jonathan Capehart, Gays And
Lesbians Owe Thanks to President George W. Bush and Justice Scalia, WASH.
POST (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/postpartisan/wp/2014/10/20/gays-and-lesbians-owe-thanks-to-president-george-wbush-and-justice-scali+a/?utm_term=.7779eae1bb00 (“By attempting to ban
gay marriage, the president sparked public debate about marriage equality
that ignited a historic backlash.”).
160 See, e.g., Nereida Moreno, Activists Create Websites to Track Anti-Trump
Events in Chicago, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 13, 2017),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-protest-websites-met20170312-story.html; Samuel Plank, Tweeting Protest: Organization and
Mobilization in the New Administration, HARV. POL. REV. (July 24, 2017),
http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/tweeting-protest-organization-andmobilization-in-the-new-administration/.
161 Arkles, supra note 52, at 615 (using the example of a trans prisoner
bringing a lawsuit against prison staff). “Even realizing the litigation
outcome will probably be unfavorable to her, she may still develop leadership
skills by rallying a broader community of people impacted by similar issues.
Additionally, she may use the knowledge and energy gained through the
lawsuit to change policy.” Although victory is nice, these can all be legitimate
and powerful objectives for litigation.
159
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opinion against the underlying cause. Marriage litigation
teams have been gently (and perhaps rightly) criticized
for “the heteronormative and traditional characteristics
present in the carefully curated set of Obergefell
plaintiffs” because “respecting individual choice in those
we love[] will require challenging mainstream norms
themselves rather than simply imitating existing
models.”162 But caution in the content of the narrative
presented to the public and to the courts is different from
an incremental approach to when and where that
narrative is told, when it comes to long-term success in
vindicating a right. As one activist-scholar writes,
A group engaged in challenging entrenched
power . . . has to contend with far more powerful
opponents in incredibly lopsided political
contests. Such a group, therefore, has not only
to foster a strong internal identity; it also has
to win allies beyond the bounds of that identity,
if it is to build the collective power it needs to
move any serious political goals forward.163
This is precisely why lawyers should engage themselves
with bridging activist communities to power structures
and ensuring that broadly relatable client narratives are
crafted. “When our subcultures become too self-referential
and incoherent to outsiders, then our words and actions
may come to function as repellants to others—even to our
allies and people who agree with us on the issues.”164 The
point at which litigation is most likely to succeed is the
point at which advocates may “credibly claim that our
[clients’] values are popular—even that they are common
sense—and connected to a substantial social base.”165 A
relatable, “common sense” narrative can and should be
shouted as loudly and as often as possible.166
Cynthia Godsoe, Perfect Plaintiffs, 125 YALE L.J.F. 136 (2015),
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/perfect-plaintiffs.
163 SMUCKER, supra note 53, at 63.
164 Id. at 56.
165 Id. at 38 (emphasis in original).
166 See, e.g., Binny Miller, Give them Back their Lives: Recognizing Client
Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 487 (1994); Benjamin L. Apt,
Aggadah, Legal Narrative, and the Law, 73 OR. L. REV. 943 (1994).
Of course, exceptions to this rule abound. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick’s
discussion of the circumstances leading to the Lawrence decision: “An
interracial, lower-middle-to-lower-class pair hooking up in a seedy apartment
162
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Volumes could be written about the relative merits
of incrementalism versus “rushing in,” but the limited
point of this section is to suggest that these considerations
should not figure heavily into an individual practitioner’s
decision as to whether or not to assert a “new” right on
behalf of a client. For this strategy to be consciously
employed and to be effective, some losses are to be
expected in the courts. Every movement in American
history has lost critical, right-defining court cases—often
more than a few. The question: what can an effective
advocate make of those losses? The answer: a relatable,
popular narrative about their clients and their rights that
can be told over and over. Examples below illustrate this
principle.
VIII.

CURRENT EXAMPLES

Each of these examples is a right that is not yet
fully realized but is in stage two of development per the
model above (that is, it has achieved some, but not total,
institutional recognition). These emerging rights could be
purposefully advanced using this model.
1. Healthcare as a Right
The discussion of healthcare as a “right” in the
United States is in its infancy but is quickly gathering
steam.167 This discussion, which started with grassroots
activists, may be seen as a direct response to social factors
that have resulted in the exclusion of millions of people
from receiving meaningful treatment without the threat
of financial ruin. The right is finally ripening, and lawyers
can assist in the process.
The idea of healthcare as a right is not a new one,
at least not outside the United States. The 1946 World
Health Organization constitution states that “the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is
one of the fundamental rights of every human being
in a marginal neighborhood: Lawrence and Garner were hardly a civil-rights
litigator’s dream plaintiffs. They were not the type to tug at judicial
heartstrings. But advocates for gay rights couldn’t afford to shop around for a
perfect plaintiff.” Lithwick, supra note 71.
167 Addy Baird, Single-Payer Health Care is Gaining Steam. These Are the
People Who Made it Possible. THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://thinkprogress.org/single-payer-political-moment-c4e0139244b1/.
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without distinction of race, religion, political belief,
economic or social condition.”168 The European Union and
the United Nations both recognize health care as a basic
human right, and as of 2015, 38% of United Nations’
member constitutions guaranteed medical care.169 It is
difficult to explain how this right has flourished for so
long in much of the rest of the world, but is just now in
the initial stages of recognition here.
However, as with marriage, there are “movers” that
formerly worked against the idea of healthcare as a right
and are now beginning to reverse course. For example, the
American Medical Association (AMA) argued against any
government intervention in healthcare at all until the
advent of Medicare/Medicaid in 1965.170 Similarly, the
AMA opposed systemic changes proposed by the Clinton
administration in the 1990s. However, it made a
noticeable shift in 2009 by supporting the original version
of the Affordable Care Act—including the addition of a
public option to insurance exchanges.171 While the AMA
does not yet support healthcare as a right, other
prominent physician-led organizations do.172
In the 2010s, spurred by the ACA debate and
countless stories of personal tragedy, the media has just
begun to weigh in on this subject in earnest.173 Right on
schedule, the first light of formal institutional recognition
can now be seen. Massachusetts passed sweeping
statewide reforms intended to provide health insurance to
Julia Kaufman, Health Care is a Right, Not a Privilege, THE KENAN
INSTITUTE FOR ETHICS,
https://archive.kenan.ethics.duke.edu/humanrights/snowball/health-care-is-aright-not-a-privilege/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2019).
169 G. H. Jones & H. Kantarjian, Health Care in the United States—Basic
Human Right or Entitlement?, 26 ANNALS OF ONCOLOGY, 2193 [needs start
page] (2015), https://academic.oup.com/annonc/article/26/10/2193/144592
(citing Jody Heymann, Constitutional Rights to Health, Public Health and
Medical Care: The Status of Health Protections in 191 Countries, 639 [needs
pincite] (July 4, 2013),
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17441692.2013.810765 (last
visited May 27, 2015)).
170 Kyle B. Jones, It’s Time to Recognize Health Care as a Right, WASH. POST
(Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-byhistory/wp/2018/01/17/its-time-to-recognize-health-care-as-aright/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.17a671f1110f.
171 Id.
172 A notable example is Physicians for a National Health Program, which
“has more than 20,000 members and chapters across the United States.”
About PNPH, PHPH, http://pnhp.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
173 See Atul Gawande, Is Health Care a Right?, NEW YORKER (Oct. 2, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/02/is-health-care-a-right.
168
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every resident of the state in 2006.174 As early as 2008,
then-candidate Obama said that he believed healthcare
“should be a right for every American.”175 In June of 2017,
the Nevada legislature passed a bill that would have
allowed residents to buy into the state’s Medicaid plan,
but the bill was vetoed by the Governor.176 Around the
same time, a statewide public “single-payer” healthcare
system was nearly enacted in California.177 In the last two
years, support for a single-payer system has shot up
dramatically; a poll showed that 51% of Americans
support such a system as of April 2018,178 up from 33% in
a similar poll conducted a year earlier.179
Healthcare writ large has not been recognized as a
right by any American court, but it may only be a matter
of time. Litigators have lost on this issue thus far, but
such losses are not uncommon in the development of a
right.180 And as with marriage, stepping-stone victories
may be within reach in the realm of healthcare-oriented
rights.181 For example, a handful of attorneys have
Mitt Romney, My Plan for Massachusetts Health Insurance Reform, BOS.
GLOBE (Nov. 24, 2004), https://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/healthwellness/2004/11/24/plan-for-massachusetts-health-insurancereform/d1I1xFpnfLcQ8Ipz4nCdpJ/story.html.
175 Transcript of Second McCain, Obama Debate, CNN POLITICS (Oct. 7, 2008,
11:34 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/10/07/presidential.debate.transcript/.
176 Gawande, supra note 173.
177 Clio Chang, What Killed Single-Payer In California? NEW REPUBLIC (June
30, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/143650/killed-single-payercalifornia. “If single-payer can’t pass with Democratic super-majorities in the
Golden State, that raises serious questions about any national effort.” Id. The
author notes that this sentiment is analogous to the question of how national
marriage equality was possible in the wake of California’s vote on Prop 8. Id.
178 Jessie Hellmann, Poll: Slim Majority of Americans Support Single-Payer
Health Care, HILL (Apr. 13, 2018),
http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/383015-poll-slim-majority-of-americanssupport-single-payer-health-care.
179 Jocelyn Kiley, Public Support for ‘Single Payer’ Health Coverage Grows,
Driven by Democrats, PEW RES. CTR. (June 23, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/06/23/public-support-for-singlepayer-health-coverage-grows-driven-by-democrats/.
180 See Gregory D. Curfman, King v. Burwell and a Right to Health Care,
HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (June 26, 2015),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20150626.048913/full/. “The
Court’s opinion in King v. Burwell, validating the subsidies provided on the
federal health insurance exchange, lends clear support for a right to health
care.” Id. But nonetheless, “the halting approach to declaring a universal
right to health care for all Americans has continued in the Supreme Court.”
Id.
181 Indeed, some victories have already been won on discrete aspects of
healthcare. The right to emergency care, the right to abortion, the right to
language access in healthcare, the right to die with dignity—these are all
174
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tackled outlandish hospital bills by seeking to have them
declared unconscionable, either under common-law
contract theories or consumer protection statutes. More
than a decade ago, Lehigh University professor George A.
Nation, III set forth the differences between procedural
and substantive unconscionability, arriving at the
conclusion that both can apply to hospital billing:
The overriding factor . . . in finding hospital
admission
contracts
procedurally
unconscionable is that urgent medical services
are necessities, and time is virtually always
important. Thus, even if a patient understands
the terms in the hospital admission contract
and decides he does not want to agree to them,
he is in no position to shop for an alternative
supplier of urgently needed medical services.
The patient must agree to the terms the
hospital offers, because the patient requires the
services. . . .Some courts have found that an
excessive markup results in substantive
unconscionability. [I]n one case expert
testimony was given that the hospital’s “full” or
“published” charges for 1995 and 1996 were
about 300% of the hospital’s costs. . . . More
recently, the national average full-charge rate
was about 345% of costs.182
These theories are slowly finding their way into the
courts. In 2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals published
the outcome of a failed attempt at an unconscionability
argument in a case called Banner Health v. Medical
Savings Insurance Co.183 Indeed, thus far, most offensive
salient examples of rights affecting healthcare that did not exist 100 years
ago. See Lily Lo, The Right to Understand Your Doctor: Protecting Language
Access Rights in Healthcare, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 377, 381 (2011);
Yvonne Lindgren, From Rights to Dignity: Drawing Lessons from Aid in
Dying and Reproductive Rights, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 779, 780 (2016).
182 George A. Nation, III, Obscene Contracts: The Doctrine of
Unconscionability and Hospital Billing of the Uninsured, 94 KY. L.J. 101,
112, 114, 118 (2005).
183 163 P.3d 1096 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
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litigation based on this theory appears to have failed. But
that is not to say that an unconscionability defense (or
even a cause of action) could not succeed under the right
circumstances.184 The lengthy, well-reasoned dissent in
Banner Health is telling:
In opposition to Banner’s motion for summary
judgment, MSIC and the patients argued the
price
terms
of
the
COAs185
were
unconscionable. In support of this argument,
the patients or their representatives who
signed the COAs presented affidavits stating
that they signed the COAs in emergency
situations, while they were under stress caused
by their medical conditions or the medical
conditions of their dependents. Several of the
patients stated in their affidavits that the
COAs were not explained to them by the
hospital personnel when they signed them, and
that they believed that signing the COAs was a
prerequisite to treatment. Furthermore, MSIC
submitted the deposition of Banner’s Vice
President of Finance, indicating that the costto-charge ratio for some medical treatments at
Banner hospitals was as low as 19.77%. These
facts raise at least the specter of
unconscionability as to the price terms in the
COAs.186
Additionally, some states have consumer protection acts
that cover unconscionable hospital billing, and these suits
seem to fare better than those relying on common law
contract principles. In Via Christi Regional Medical
For a promising start which resulted in abject disappointment, see the
tortured history of Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (S.D.
Fla. 2006), which ended up in protracted litigation over whether the plaintiff
would owe the hospital its fees and costs for losing at the summary judgment
stage. See also Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 335 Fed. 29 (11th Cir. 2009).
185 COA is a common acronym meaning “Conditions of Admission” forms.
186 163 P.3d at 1109 (Kessler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184
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Center, Inc. v. Reed,187 the Kansas Supreme Court
reversed the determination by the lower court judge on
unconscionability. “The judge said that Reed sought ‘to
attack the healthcare system’ and that ‘there is virtual
universal agreement [that] it is in need of repair’ but
ruled that the actions of Via Christi were not
unconscionable.”188 Nonetheless, the court held, “a
hospital may engage in unconscionable conduct prohibited
by the Kansas Consumer Protection Act when (1) it files
and pursues enforcement of a lien based upon a bill
inaccurate because of overcharges or duplicate charges,
and (2) the hospital has enjoyed superior bargaining
power when compared to its patient.”189 These holdings
sow the seeds of what could ultimately put an end to
health care usury and ultimately help shape a judicially
recognized right to healthcare.
2.

The Right to Use Cannabis

The idea of the right to cannabis usage has existed
in one form or another for decades, usually under the
umbrella of privacy rights or broader libertarian concepts.
But it is medicinal usage that has gradually put a
spotlight on cannabis rights over the last forty years.190
Here one can see institutional recognition at a further
stage of development than healthcare, one akin to the
recognitional limbo that marriage equality was in in the
mid-to-late 2000s. In fact, California voters authorized
use of medical cannabis by referendum back in 1996,
making it the pioneering state on medical cannabis
around the same time that Baehr v. Lewin was decided in
Hawaii; a similar trajectory may be observed between
these two issues since then.191 Today, thirty-three states
and the District of Columbia all formally make allowances
of some kind for medical cannabis use.192
314 P.3d 852, 859 (Kan. 2013).
Id. at 859.
189 Id. at 868.
190 Scott C. Martin, A Brief History of Marijuana Law in America, TIME (Apr.
20, 2016), http://time.com/4298038/marijuana-history-in-america/.
191 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2001).
192 Francis J. Mootz III, Ethical Cannabis Lawyering in California, 9 ST.
MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 6, 6 (2018).
187
188
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Meanwhile, the U.S. government’s enforcement of
federal anti-cannabis provisions is, in itself, emblematic of
institutional struggle to recognize a right. While the
federal government has continued to insist that cannabis
remain a Schedule I narcotic, the Obama administration
issued a memorandum in late 2009 declaring that U.S.
attorneys “should not focus federal resources in your
states on individuals whose actions are in clear and
unambiguous compliance with existing state laws
providing for the medical use of marijuana . . . .”193 The
Trump administration, however, rescinded that
memorandum and the Obama-era laxity regarding
cannabis enforcement, “although it is unclear whether
[Trump] will deploy the assets of the Justice Department
to prosecute persons for activity that conforms to statelegal cannabis programs.”194
Court cases on marijuana rights have had mixed
results, but have not been universally anti-cannabis. An
anomalous opinion from the Alaska Supreme Court
effectively legalized small amounts of recreational
marijuana in 1975.195 But even a half-century later,
states’ rights arguments held little sway with the United
States Supreme Court, as evidenced by cannabis users’
successive (and decisive) defeats in United States v.
Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative196 and Gonzales v.
Raich.197 Both of these decisions held that California’s
medical marijuana provisions could not trump the federal
Controlled Substances Act.198 Since those decisions,
however, courts and legal scholars are discussing the
jurisprudence of cannabis usage more frequently, often
under a theory of established rights such as due process
or unique state constitutional provisions.199
While many courts and the federal executive
branch remain stuck in limbo, the development of
Id. at 22 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 24.
195 Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
196 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
197 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
198 Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 801–
904 (2012)).
199 Scott Bomboy, Interest Picks Up in Legal Marijuana as Constitutional
Issue, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Apr. 16, 2015),
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/interest-picks-up-in-legal-marijuana-asconstitutional-issue/; Jared L. Hausmann, Sex, Drugs, and Due Process:
Justice Kennedy’s New Federalism as a Framework for Marijuana
Liberalization, 53 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 271, 272 (2015).
193
194
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cannabis rights continues full steam ahead on the ground.
Since the Oakland Cannabis decision in 2001, public
support for recreational marijuana legalization has nearly
doubled.200 Some polls have public support for medical
marijuana at a staggering 99%.201 This is not just in
states considered more progressive; Florida recently
added a provision for medical cannabis to its state
constitution, and Oklahoma recently became the
fourteenth state to allow medicinal use by a voterinitiated measure.202 More states now allow medical
cannabis than those that prohibit it—a state of
equilibrium that did not exist for very long in the case of
marriage equality before total institutional recognition As
with marriage, ballot initiatives for recreational—or
“responsible”—use of cannabises are underway in
numerous states and have already been successful in
some, including California.203
In short, cannabis rights are on the verge of total
institutional recognition; a lawyer adeptly coordinating
these five movers could help accelerate the process.
3.

The Death Penalty

Capital punishment in America is also likely on the
cusp of dramatic change. In 2014, a federal judge struck
down California’s death penalty.204 In the first two pages
of the opinion, Judge Cormac J. Carney, a George W.
Bush appointee, summarized his reasoning:
Hannah Hartig & Abigail Geiger, About Six-In-Ten Americans Support
Marijuana Legalization, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 5, 2018),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/05/americans-supportmarijuana-legalization/.
201 Max Greenwood, Poll: Support for Legal Marijuana Hits All-Time High,
HILL (Apr. 26, 2018 12:37 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/news/385018poll-support-for-legal-marijuana-hits-all-time-high.
202 Paul Armentano, Public Support for Medical Marijuana Access is
Overwhelming and Bipartisan, HILL (June 30, 2018 06:00 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/29/supreme-court-strikes-down-deathpenalty-june-29-1972-239938.
203 Thomas Fuller, Recreational Pot is Officially Legal in California, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/us/legal-potcalifornia.html; see also Vince Sliwoski, State Legal Cannabis in 2018: Who’s
Next?, CANNA L. BLOG (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.cannalawblog.com/statelegal-cannabis-in-2018-whos-next/.
204 Erik Eckholm & John Schwartz, California Death Penalty System is
Unconstitutional, Federal Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/17/us/california-death-penaltyunconstitutional-federal-judge-says.html.
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[S]ystemic delay has made . . . execution so
unlikely that the death sentence carefully and
deliberately imposed by the jury has been
quietly transformed into one no rational jury or
legislature could ever impose: life in prison,
with the remote possibility of death. As for the
random few for whom execution does become a
reality, they will have languished for so long on
death row that their execution will serve no
retributive or deterrent purpose and will be
arbitrary.205
Carney’s ruling was ultimately overturned,206 but
California has not executed a prisoner in twelve years,
and the legal landscape of the death penalty is changing
in a way that can be compared to the development of the
other rights discussed above.
As with the right to healthcare, the United States
lags decades behind most of the rest of the world when it
comes to capital punishment.207 The only industrialized
nations left that retain the death penalty are Singapore,
Taiwan, Japan, and the U.S.208
Furthermore, institutional recognition that
individuals may demand their government refrain from
putting them to death is not new, even here in the United
States. A nationwide moratorium was imposed by the
Supreme Court in 1972, butwas lifted in 1976.209 “Since
then, one branch or another of government in several
states has done away with the death penalty.”210
“Currently, 32 states are referred to as ‘retentionist’ (that
Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
See Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).
207 See generally Lincoln Caplna, The Growing Gap Between the U.S. and the
International Anti-Death-Penalty Consensus, NEW YORKER (Dec. 31, 2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-growing-gap-between-the-us-and-the-international-anti-death-penalty-consensus.
208 Oliver Smith, Mapped: The 53 Places That Still Have The Death Penalty—
Including Japan, TELEGRAPH (July 6, 2018, 12:00 PM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/maps-and-graphics/countries-that-stillhave-the-death-penalty/.
209 Andrew Glass, Supreme Court Strikes Down Death Penalty, June 29, 1972,
POLITICO (June 29, 2017, 12:00 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/29/supreme-court-strikes-down-deathpenalty-june-29-1972-239938.
210 Dan Canon, Opinion: Death Penalty In Kentucky Is An Expensive,
Ineffective, Obsolete Relic, INSIDER LOUISVILLE (Aug. 29, 2014, 10:17 AM),
https://insiderlouisville.com/health/social_good/death-penalty/.
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is, they retain the use of capital punishment).”211 Carney’s
ruling is based in part on Justice Brennan’s concurring
opinion in the 1972 case that put the death penalty on
hold. Brennan wrote: “When the punishment of death is
inflicted in a trivial number of the cases in which it is
legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable
that it is being inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of
little more than a lottery system.”212 Since the
reinstatement of capital punishment the following year,213
the categories of people to whom that punishment may be
applied have been steadily reduced by judicial fiat. 214 In
Kentucky alone, the last two years have yielded decisions
demanding more exacting science in competency
determinations, and abolishing capital punishment
altogether for everyone under twenty-one at the time of
the crime.215
But the deadest giveaway that this right may soon
advance from stage two to stage three comes from Justice
Breyer who, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote the
following in 2015: “[R]ather than try to patch up the
death penalty’s legal wounds one at a time, I would ask
for full briefing on a more basic question: whether the
death penalty violates the Constitution. . . . [T]he death
penalty, in and of itself, now likely constitutes a legally

Id.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 293 (1972).
213 Introduction to the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty (last visited Sept. 3,
2018).
214 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (barring capital
punishment for those convicted of non-homicide crimes, including child rape);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (juvenile offenders); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (individuals with intellectual disabilities);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (rapists). From a purely theoretical
standpoint, there is no “evolving standard of decency” associated with a
Fourteenth Amendment-based fundamental right to marriage, although
standards have obviously evolved over time. In the Eighth Amendment, by
contrast, there is a built-in mechanism for evolution, making abolition via the
Constitution an easier legal argument—but only once the social conditions
are right.
215 Judge: Death Penalty Unconstitutional for Defendant Under 21, U.S. NEWS
(Aug. 4, 2017, 6:38 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/kentucky/articles/2017-08-04/judge-death-penalty-unconstitutional-fordefendant-under-21; Caitlin McGlade, Kentucky Supreme Court Rules Death
Penalty IQ Law Is Unconstitutional, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (June 27, 2018,
12:02 PM), https://www.courierjournal.com/story/news/politics/2018/06/14/kentucky-supreme-court-rulingmental-competency/702539002/.
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prohibited ‘cruel and unusual punishmen[t].’”216 Breyer,
in essence, asked to be given the right case.
This shift in judicial attitudes about capital
punishment can be explained by reference to our movers.
The media, covering activists and organizations like the
Innocence Project, along with a vast body of research by
academics suggesting that the death penalty does no
practical good for anyone,217 have helped to change the
public’s view of the death penalty dramatically since the
1970s.218 Take, for example, the incredible number of
ghastly mishaps associated with lethal injection. Accounts
of executions taking hours because officials could not find
a vein, or administered the drugs incorrectly, or because
the condemned person simply would not die properly,
have been prominent in the news for years now.219 The
last few years have seen an upswing in these horror
stories due to states using “experimental” drugs, which,
for obvious reasons, have not been approved, tested, or
even evaluated by any self-respecting medical
professional.220 Then there are the exonerations to
contend with: 150 people have been released from death
Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2755. It remains to be seen how the retirement of
Justice Kennedy, who authored many of the Court’s watershed death penalty
cases, will affect the likelihood of further progress on this issue. For a
fascinating exploration of how Kennedy’s “equal dignity” standard from
LGBT-rights opinions might yet affect the Court’s death-penalty
jurisprudence, see Kevin Barry, The Death Penalty & the Dignity Clauses,
102 IOWA L. REV. 383 (2017).
217 See, e.g., Discussion of Recent Deterrence Studies, DEATH PENALTY
INFORMATION CENTER , https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/discussion-recentdeterrence-studies (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).
218 Frank R. Baumgartner, Emily Williams & Kaneesha Johnson, Americans
Are Turning Against The Death Penalty. Are Politicians Far Behind?, WASH.
POST (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2015/12/07/americans-are-turning-against-the-death-penalty-arepoliticians-far-behind/?utm_term=.7040f193cb3f; see also Richard C. Dieter,
Changing Views on the Death Penalty in the United States, Paper Delivered
at the Conference On Alternatives to the Death Penalty in U.S.A and China,
10 n.27 (Oct. 7, 2007), available at
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/files/pdf/Beijing07.pdf. “RT Strategies of
Washington, D.C., conducted this National Omnibus Poll on March 8–11,
2007 for the Death Penalty Information Center. The sample was 1,000 adults
nationwide, and the margin of error was +3.1%.” Id.
219 Michael L. Radelet, Botched Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION
CENTER, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/some-examples-post-furman-botchedexecutions (last visited Sept. 3, 2018) (where University of Colorado professor
lists over fifty new stories of “botched” executions).
220 See generally Austin Sarat, Robert H. Weaver & Heather Richard, Lethal
Injection Leads to the Most Botched Executions, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 30, 2014),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/30/lethal-injection-leads-tothe-most-botched-executions.html.
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row since 1973 upon proof of actual innocence.221 These
exonerations often occurred after the inmate had
exhausted the lengthy appeals process.222 DNA evidence
swoops in to save the day just before a prisoner’s last
meal,223 an eyewitness recants decades later,224 the real
killer confesses, etc. Innocent people have undoubtedly
been killed by the state: people who did not have the
benefit of DNA evidence, or a competent lawyer, an
unbiased jury, or—again—just dumb luck.225 A growing
public awareness of this inescapable conclusion is finally
undermining the integrity of the American death penalty.
This is evidenced by recent polls demonstrating that for
the first time, less than 50% of the American public
believes that capital punishment is applied fairly,226 and
opposition to the practice overall was at an all-time low in
2017.227

Innocence: List of Those Freed From Death Row, DEATH PENALTY
INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-thosefreed-death-row?scid=6&did=110 (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).
222 Dan Canon, Opinion: Death Penalty in Kentucky is an Expensive,
Ineffective, Obsolete Relic, INSIDER LOUISVILLE (Aug. 29, 2014, 10:17 AM),
https://insiderlouisville.com/health/social_good/death-penalty/.
223 Chris Kenning, Missouri Governor Halts Execution to Examine Questions
Over DNA, REUTERS (Aug. 22, 2017, 3:04 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-missouri-execution-idUSKCN1B2280.
224 See Times Editorial Board, Eyewitness Testimony is Often Unreliable and
Police and Lawmakers Know It, L.A. TIMES (May 08, 2018, 4:10 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-eyewitness-testimony20180508-story.html.
225 The examples are quite literally countless. Cameron Todd Willingham,
executed in Texas after being convicted of murder on the basis of junk
science, is a stark example. See Maurice Possley & The Marshall Project,
Fresh Doubts Over a Texas Execution, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2014/08/03/fresh-doubts-over-atexas-execution/. Ruben Cantu, whose accuser recanted after his execution, is
believed by almost everyone involved in that case, including the prosecutor,
to have been innocent. The state’s response was to threaten the prosecuting
witness with a “murder by perjury” charge. Rick Casey, “Murder by Perjury”
in Cantu Case?, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 4 2005),
http://www.chron.com/news/casey/article/Casey-Murder-by-perjury-in-Cantucase-1936595.php.
226 Justin McCarthy, New Low of 49% in U.S. Say Death Penalty Applied
Fairly, GALLUP NEWS SERV. (Oct. 22, 2018),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/243794/new-low-say-death-penalty-appliedfairly.aspx.
227 Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Death Penalty Support Lowest Since 1972, GALLUP
NEWS SERV. (Oct. 26, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/221030/deathpenalty-support-lowest-1972.aspx.
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CONCLUSION

The above model may serve as a starting point for
practitioners grappling with the reality of emerging rights
in the twenty-first century. Rights will continue to come
into being at stage one of this model with or without
involvement by the bar, but it is the movement from
partial institutional recognition (stage two) to total
institutional recognition (stage three) that an individual
practitioner should be most keenly focused on. Given the
increasing pace at which new rights achieve institutional
recognition, a “wait-and-see” attitude makes little sense
with regard to whether to pursue litigation; rather, a
lawyer should be mindful of what the proper narrative
should be for a client who seeks to vindicate a right that is
not yet wholly recognized, and what vehicles may be used
to help further the client’s cause—both in the context of
litigation and in the broader context of a social movement
overall. Those vehicles may be conceptualized as the five
“movers” described herein. A conscious, deliberate choice
by a practitioner to incorporate these movers into what
might otherwise by a myopic, traditional litigation
strategy is more likely to produce durable and desirable
outcomes for a client.

